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Abriss
Die Arbeit setzt sich mit der Nachfragemacht und der generellen Position von Le-
bensmittelhändlern in Österreich auseinander. In den letzten Jahrzehnten hat sich 
eine deutliche Verschiebung der Macht von den Konsumenten zu den großen Le-
bensmittelhändlern, nicht nur auf dem österreichischen Lebensmittelmarkt abge-
zeichnet. Grund für diese Entwicklung sind neben Industrialisierung, Globalisierung 
und einer vermehrten M&A Aktivität auch ein wandelnder Lebensstil und die damit 
einhergehenden Veränderungen der alltäglichen Bedürfnisse. Durch zunehmenden 
Stress ist Zeitmangel ein gängiges Phänomen unserer Gesellschaft. Um diesem 
Problem entgegenzukommen entstehen Geschäfte mit immer größeren Verkaufsflä-
chen um einem stetig wachsenden Produktsortiment Platz zu machen. Dies wieder-
um ermöglicht es  dem Kunden an nur einem Ort fast sämtliche Einkäufe zu erledigen 
und somit an Zeit zu gewinnen. 
Parallel dazu, reduzierte sich im Laufe der Jahre die Zahl der Lebensmittelhändler 
stark. Im Jahr 2005 hielten die Top-5-Unternehmen einen Marktanteil von mehr als 
78%. Nur 3 Jahre später, im Jahr 2008 werden 78,5% von den Top-3; Rewe, Spar 
und Hofer gehalten. Im europaweiten Schnitt weist Österreich einen der höchsten 
Konzentrationsgrade im Lebensmittelhandel auf. Dies ist besonders kritisch zu sehen 
in Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass die Lebensmittelpreise in Österreich deutlich über 
denen Deutschlands  liegen, die Begründung dafür jedoch unklar ist. Daher liegt die 
Vermutung über eine mögliche Preisabsprache und verminderter Konkurrenz zwi-
schen Lebensmittelhändlern, sehr nahe. 
Ziel der Arbeit ist es, sich ein klares Bild über den österreichischen Lebensmittel-
markt zu verschaffen und dessen Probleme aufzuzeigen. Zu Beginn werden die 
Auswirkungen von Nachfragemacht anhand von theoretischen Modellen veranschau-
licht. Weiters werden Strategien beschrieben, die es Händlern ermöglicht eine bevor-
zugte Stellung innerhalb der Wertschöpfungskette zu erreichen. Anschließend wer-
den Indikatoren beschrieben, anhand derer Nachfragemacht zu bestimmen ist. Den 
Schluss bildet der praxisrelevante Teil, der Einblick in die Geschehnisse des öster-
reichischen Lebensmittelmarktes in den letzten Jahrzehnten gibt und die Funktion 
von Politik und Wettbewerbsbehörde kritisch untersucht. 
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Abstract
The thesis  deals with the topic of buyer power in retailing in Austria. In recent years a 
power shift has occurred, with the emphasis toward the retailer. This was due to in-
dustrialization, globalization, and increased M&A activity among grocery retailers 
coupled with people‘s changing lifestyles. As a consequence customers now demand 
more and differentiated products  and services, than a few decades ago. Nowadays it 
is  important for customers to have a one-stop-shopping opportunity offering a broad 
product range, since their busy lifestyle does not allow lots of time for extensive gro-
cery shopping. Specialist shops such as butcheries or greengrocers  become end-of-
range models. 
At the same time the number of grocery retailers decreased significantly in Austria. In 
2005 the five largest food retailers held a market share of more than 78%, whereas  in 
2008 only the top three namely, Rewe, Spar and Hofer held a common market share 
of 78.5%. In fact Austria has one of the highest concentration levels  in grocery retail-
ing across Europe. In addition, it is particularly noticeable that prices in Austria are 
significantly higher than in Germany. The difference in prices could not be justified by 
any serious or obvious argument. Consequently food retailers are suspected of price 
fixing and it assumed that competition is limited.
The following work gives the reader a clear picture of the Austrian market in food re-
tailing, along with its problems and dynamics. By starting with a theoretical model, 
the reader should get an idea of the overall economic impact of buyer power in the-
ory. 
Furthermore, the strategic actions that retailers use to establish a powerful position 
within the supply chain are explained. After that the reader will learn about the differ-
ent indicators of buyer power. Finally the focus lies on the development of the Aus-
trian market and its retailers in recent years and what has been attempted by politi-
cians and competition authorities to get things straight.
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1.Introduction
1.1 Overview
The past few decades bore testament to a substantial change in retailing, not only 
within Europe, but more generally across the world. The supermarkets, as we know 
them today, evolved from the Co-operative movement in 19th century in Britain. The 
first step was initiated by local retailers who banded together to sell their products to 
working people at prices they could afford.1Furthermore, industrialisation and techno-
logical advancement heralded the beginning of a new era, one with an emerging de-
mand for mass consumer goods  and a decrease in agricultural production, as cheap 
food from other countries became available.2In 1948 following the second World War 
the Agricultural Act reinforced the “cheap food policy“3 that dominates the current cli-
mate and this post war boom laid the foundations for an immense increase in produc-
tion and the supermarket revolution. With the Resale Act, abolished in 1964, thus 
enabling manufacturers and suppliers to determine the price retailers  sold their prod-
ucts for. From this point on retailers decided on prices and low price strategies 
evolved to attract customers.4 
Along with the conventional supermarket new store formats  also emerged. The su-
perstore, often more than twice the size of the conventional supermarket, offers the 
possibility of one-stop-shopping. Quite often located out of town, this can be inter-
preted as a response to the new lifestyle people have adopted. Beyond this, hyper-
markets  with a size between 9.000 m² and 30.000 m² offer the largest range of food 
and non-food items and are always located out of town.5  The typical convenience 
store is not a supermarket, as it has  less floor space and consumers  are top-up 
rather than one-trip shoppers. Convenience stores range from the private owned 
11
1 Michaels (2002)p.3
2 Seth and Randall (1999)p.8-9
3 Michaels (2002)p.3
4 Michaels (2002)p.3
5 Zentes, Morschett  and Schramm-Klein (2007)
corner shop next door to the symbol group retailers such as Spar, but their existence 
is evanescent. 6 
One should not underestimate the significance of retailers, as they represent the link 
between producers  and consumers. Their power and influence in every respect for 
both consumers and producers  is immense. Hence, the trend observed in recent 
years is towards larger retailers and highly concentrated markets across Europe. 
This  has been a field of interest to economists and authorities, but it is controversial 
as to whether authorities pay due attention to this problem. Without doubt this offers 
consumers a broader range of products and an extensive variety adapted to their 
lifestyles; however, it may be argued this is at the expense of traditional and expert 
retailers.7  Table (1) illustrates those European countries where the five largest gro-
cery retailers controlled more than 70% of market share in 2005, with Austria being 
one. This is in contrast with Poland, the Czech Republic, Greece, and Italy, all of 
whom face a relatively low five-firm concentration level.8   
Table1: EU States where the top 5 retailers made up more than 70% of the grocery market in 2005 
Country Market Share
Finland 90.02 %
Sweden 81.80 %
Ireland 81.40 %
Slovenia 81.60 %
Estonia 78.80 %
Austria 78.70 %
Germany 70.10 %
France 70.00 %
Source: author unknown (2007) 
http://www.responsible-purchasing.org/assets/docs/EU%20MEP%20Retail%20Briefing.pdf
Given that we find eight countries with a concentration level of more than 70 % in 
2005, it is not surprising to discover that among most EU states the five-firm concen-
tration ratio increased from 1993 to 1996  to 1999, as Table (2) indicates. These de-
velopments were pivotal for the change in the relationship between suppliers and re-
tailers. As the market share of retailers increased dramatically, the former supplier-
driven market shifted to a market where retailers posses authority, thus permitting 
them buyer power over suppliers. Since retailers face fewer competitors, suppliers 
12
6 Michaels (2002)p.5 
7 Dobson (2002)p.1 
8 Perkins (2001)p.745
are forced to deal with them as they represent the link between consumers and sup-
pliers. Their power is  accumulated through: their high share of market, a declining 
number of retailers, and their pivotal role as a connector between producers  and 
consumers, all of which combine to allow retailers to charge suppliers (e.g. slotting 
allowances) for direct access to their stores or offer exclusive contracts to specific 
suppliers.9 
Table 2: Five-Firm Concentration (%) in Grocery and Daily Good Retailing for EU Member States
1993 1996 1999
Austria 54.2 58.6 60.2
Belgium & Luxembourg 60.2 61.6 60.9
Denmark 54.2 59.5 56.4
Finland 93.5 89.1 68.4
France 47.5 50.6 56.3
Germany 45.1 45.4 44.1
Greece 10.9 25.8 26.8
Ireland 62.6 64.2 58.3
Italy 10.9 11.8 17.6
Netherlands 52.5 50.4 56.2
Portugal 36.5 55.7 63.2
Spain 21.6 32.1 40.3
Sweden 79.3 77.9 78.2
UK 50.2 56.2 63.0
EU 15 (weighted av) 40.7 43.7 48.9
Source: Dobson P. (2002)p.7
1.2 Retailers in Europe
In a global ranking by Deloitte (2009) the 250 largest retailers worldwide were as-
sessed based on non-auto retail sales for the fiscal year 2007. The European Top 10 
are illustrated in Table (3) and most striking is the fact that France, Germany and the 
UK dominate the market in terms of retail sales. ‘Ahold‘, a Dutch retailer, dropped in 
rank from 2002 and was replaced by the French ITM, but with this exception, the Top 
9 remained unchanged from the 2006 survey. The European Top 10 are among the 
25 largest retailers in the Global 250 ranking and all operate in food retailing.10 In ad-
dition, the French and German retailers  are leaders in global operations. On average 
the French retailers are active in 18.9 different countries and some 35.3% of their 
13
9 Dobson (2002)p.1
10 Deloitte (2009)p.29
sales are foreign-derived. German retailers operate on average in 13.8 countries  and 
make over 40% of their sales abroad.11 
 Table3: Top 10 European Retailers in 2007
Ranking Top 250 
Ranking
Company Country of 
Origin
Retail Sales in 
US$ billions
1 2 Carrefour France 112.6
2 3 Tesco UK 94.7
3 4 Metro Germany 87.6
4 7 Schwarz Germany 69.3
5 10 Aldi Germany 58.5
6 12 Rewe Germany 51.9
7 14 Auchan France 49.3
8 18 E. Leclerc France 44.7
9 19 Edeka Zentrale Germany 44.6
10 23 ITM (Intermarché) France 40.7
Source: Deloitte(2009)p.30
Importantly, European retailers did not grow by merely internal expansion and incor-
porating overseas operations. Recent mergers and acquisitions of the major players 
in Europe have added to the increased concentration of retailers. In Finland the 
merger of Kesko and Tuko came under severe criticism. Finland had no domestic 
authorities charged with regulating mergers within its  borders. Therefore, after it had 
been accomplished, the case was directed to the EC which rejected the acquisition 
on the grounds that Kesko would act as a gatekeeper in the acquisition of Tuko.12 In 
Austria the takeover of the Julius  Meinl AG by Rewe was rejected in 1999, as  Rewe 
would have had a monopolistic position within the eastern part of Austria and a con-
trolling position in the procurement market. But the commission agreed on the acqui-
sition of 162 Meinl-stores without taking control over the entire Julius Meinl AG.13 
While the commission authorities within Europe are not entirely ineffective, they do 
face severe criticism regarding their lack of control over the emerging concentration 
among retailers and the subsequent  detrimental effects on competition and welfare. 
In the French market, authorities seemed to be largely ignorant of the M&A activities 
within food retailing. In 1996 Auchan, a leading French grocery retailer, acquired Pão 
de Açúcar, a major player in Portugal. As well, Carrefour merged with Promodès in 
1999 to become Europe‘s  leading and the world‘s number two retailer, after 
14
11 Deloitte (2009)p.27
12 Lehtinen (1997) http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=5859 
13 see: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/99/83
Wal-Mart.14  As stated in recent news Germany‘s biggest retailer, Metro, is on the 
lookout for new growth opportunities together with Arcandor, the holding company of 
Karstadt and the biggest department store in Germany together with Metros Kaufhof. 
Since 2008, Metro has planned to sell Kaufhof,15 so far without success, but it is  ru-
moured by experts that Metro and Arcandor plan to merge Kaufhof and Karstadt by 
creating a joint venture, with Arcandor holding 51% and Metro 49%. Aside from vari-
ous synergies this  would result in a major decline in competition, beneficial to Metro 
and Arcandor, but hopefully alarming to the German and other European competition 
authorities.   
In addition, collaboration and consolidation among retailers impedes one‘s ability to 
achieve a clear picture of the real levels of concentration. Retailers collaborate not 
only on a national level but equally across borders via buyer groups or alliances, 
such as EMD and AMS. The top seven European alliances, in combination with the 
top three retailers, are responsible for more than 50% of the food supplies within 
Europe. Furthermore, contracts  between suppliers  and retailers are no longer fixed 
on a long-term basis  but rather determined through online exchanges and Internet-
based auctions, where the contract is offered to those suppliers  offering the lowest 
price. This can have major impacts upon suppliers‘ survival, as  long-term contracts 
help to ensure that their investments are somewhat safe. This  is in opposition to the 
current situation whereby producers compete for contracts on a short-term basis, and 
with an uncertain and potentially volatile future income, so too do they alter their in-
vestment decisions. In addition they may feel pressured to reduce prices to levels  be-
low the cost of production and if experienced over a longer period may result in insol-
vency.  Alternatively, so as suppliers can remain within the market under such cir-
cumstances, they may elect to reduce the quality of products to a level below stan-
dards. While perhaps not noticed instantly by quality-control-agencies, this results in 
a degraded quality for consumers.16 
15
14 see: http://www.carrefour.com/cdc/group/history/
15 Seidel and Seidlitz (2008) http://www.welt.de/ 
16 Dobson (2002)p.2-3
2. Theoretical background
The following section discusses  the underpinning theory. I shall start by providing 
some basic definitions  of the terms that will appear often within the thesis and give 
a brief introduction to some microeconomic theory, before examining the more de-
tailed cases including monoponsy and others.
2.1 Scope of theory
Prior to dealing with buyer power it is  paramount to determine the field of research 
and more broadly the branch of science within which it is  imbedded. As a student of 
international business, the starting point of my thesis in science lies within the field 
of economics and management. 
This is noteworthy as  buyer power can be analysed within the field of social and 
political science or the jurisprudence and others. It does  not entail that these sci-
ences  will be excluded, contrariwise they will have some impact on the topic, but 
the focus lies within the theory of economics  and management, and more precisely 
on microeconomic theory.
2.2 Definition of Buyer Power
One definition of power is the “possession of control, authority or influence over 
others“.17 
However buyer power is a broad term and therefore an ultimate definition is difficult 
to find. The following section should give the reader an insight into the problem of 
buyer power. Within this  section I give an overview of what buyer power is referred 
to in general. Not only the definition of buyer power is important but also defining 
the different types and approaches of buyer power and other related terms. Elabo-
rating this is essential, as it demonstrates at an early stage that buyer power has 
different facets. 
Monopsony power is essential to analyse when searching for a definition of buyer 
power. A monopsony exists  if one buyer faces several competitive suppliers.18 Mo-
nopsony power is the reverse of monopolist power. As the monopolist is the only 
seller in a market, she increases the price of his good by selling a lower amount. 
16
17 Könemann(1993) p.789
18 Clarke et al.(2004) p.9
On the other side the monopsonist, the single buyer in a market, increases the 
price of the good he purchases by lowering the amount he buys. Both influence the 
price by varying the amount sold, or in the case of the monopsonist, purchased. It 
is  noteworthy that within this  approach the buyer does not discriminate among sup-
pliers. Even if monopsony power is  the determining factor for price reduction, it re-
duces the market price. Hence all sellers are affected not only certain.19
One definition is that: 
“Monopsony power is understood to mean those instances where a price decrease is such that 
it falls below competitive levels and there is a corresponding reduction in the input supplied or a 
corresponding diminishment in any other dimension of competition.“20
Another approach to buyer power focuses rather on bargaining power or, in other 
words, countervailing power. This approach is concerned with whether the buyer in 
relation to his  competitors receives a better price through bargaining power, which 
is “the power to obtain a concession from another party by threatening to impose a 
cost, or withdraw a benefit, if the party does not grant the concession.“21 Bargaining 
power has  to be distinguished from monopsony power. It is noteworthy that the 
former reduces the price by threatening to lower the amount to be purchased, while 
the latter reduces the price by actually lowering the amount to be purchased.22 
It is assumed that competitive suppliers  set their price equal to the marginal cost, 
therefore only suppliers under imperfect conditions can reduce their price when 
threatened by a buyer, as they set their price above the marginal cost curve. For 
that reason bargaining power equals countervailing power, and more precisely bar-
gaining power is the compensative power against market power on the 
supply-side.23 Another definition depicts countervailing power as “[a] situation which 
predominates when the excessive market power of firms is counterbalanced by op-
posing market powers possessed by traders who sell to or buy from the former.“24 
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19 Kirkwood(2004) p.36
20 Competition Bureau Canada (2008) http://www.cb-bc.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/home
21 Kirkwood cited by Chen(2008) p.244
22 Chen(2008) p.244
23 Chen(2008) p.244-245
24 Goede(1997) p.302
Another approach incorporates  monopsony power as well as  bargaining power. 
Considering this approach, the factors determining buyer power are not competitive 
prices  or conditions  suppliers face, but rather conditions  other buyers receive or 
would receive in a competitive market. As competitive conditions suppliers face 
may be imperfect and prices other buyers receive are uncertain to lie above or un-
der the suppliers marginal costs, this approach combines bargaining power with 
monopsony power.25
Finally the following definition arises:
“Buyer power is the ability of a buyer to reduce price profitably below a supplier‘s normal  selling 
price, or more generally the ability to obtain terms of supply more favourable than a supplier‘s 
normal terms. The normal selling price, in turn, is defined as the supplier‘s profit-maximising 
price in the absence of buyer power. In the case where there is perfect competition among sup-
pliers, the normal selling price of a supplier is the competitive price, and buyer power is monop-
sony power. On the other hand, in the case where competition among suppliers is imperfect, the 
normal selling price is above the competitive price, and the buyer power is countervailing 
power.“26
2.3 Economic Theory
Most microeconomic textbooks focus on perfect competition, oligopoly and monop-
oly. What these three market structures have in common, is that they all face numer-
ous participants on the demand side, but they differ from each other by the number of 
suppliers, as illustrated in Figure (1). But for further investigation of buyer power it is 
essential to study market structures where only few participants or even only one 
dominates the demand side. Therefore the following section will focus on those mar-
ket structures, which are  relevant when analysing the underlying theory of buyer 
power. 
But before going into detail on market structures it is crucial to note that Figure (1) 
only observes face-to-face market power, therefore it is assumed that suppliers do 
not have buying power and the demand side has no power in selling. But a firm can 
actually have a superior position in buying and selling, which can have major impli-
cations for competition.27 
18
25 Chen(2008) p.245
26 Chen(2008) p.247
27 Dobson, Waterson and Chu (1998)p.8-9
Figure 1: The structure of markets
SUPPLY SIDE FORM
MANY FEW ONE
DEMAND
SIDE
FORM
MANY
Perfect 
Competition
Oligopoly Monopoly
FEW Oligoponsy
Bilateral
oligopoly
Monopoly
oligopsony
ONE Monopsony
Oligopoly- 
monopsony
Bilateral
monopoly
Source: Dobson P., M. Waterson and A. Chu (1998) p. 8
In order to measure real life markets it is fundamental to have an ideal model as a 
benchmark. This ideal model within economic theory is the model of perfect compe-
tition, which allows economists  to demonstrate that generally society is worse off 
when markets are imperfect.28 
In a perfect competitive market both suppliers and buyers are price takers. They 
sell and buy at the equilibrium price. If a supplier raises his  price above the equilib-
rium, a buyer would switch to one of his competitors, hence suppliers  have to stay 
within the equilibrium price. Vice versa, if the buyer tries to negotiate on obtaining a 
lower price, the supplier will sell his product to other customers, as  there are suffi-
cient willing to buy at the equilibrium price. Thus a perfect competitive market is 
characterised by a multitude of suppliers and buyers. In addition products need to 
be homogeneous. If a supplier raises the price above the equilibrium, buyers are 
only able to switch to competitors given that there exists  a perfect substitute to this 
product. Therefore a perfectly competitive market needs homogeneous goods. An-
other characteristic in an efficient market is that there are no entry or exit barriers. 
Given that a new firm can exit and enter the market with no extra costs, it is en-
sured that the perfectly competitive market can be sustained by the multitude of 
buyers and sellers.29 
19
28 Perloff (2004) p.232
29 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2009) p.272-273
2.3.1 Monopsony
The model of perfect competition rarely holds  within reality, but it is  crucial to con-
sider before investigating the theory of monopsony, which is most adequate when 
investigating buyer power.
As already mentioned, monopsony power is the opposite to monopoly power. The 
distinction between monopoly and monopsony power is that monopoly power is due 
to market power on the supply side and monopsony power due to market power on 
the demand side. However both do have comparable implications on social welfare.30 
2.3.1.1 Model of Monopsony31
To demonstrate the implications of monopsony power, I utilise the model of monop-
sony by Blair R.D. and Harrison J.L.(1993):
A firm based in a small town produces textiles (X) by hiring labour (W) and ma-
chines (A).
It has the following production function:
X=X(W,A)                                                          (1.1)
According to the insulated area in which the firm is based, it holds a monopsony posi-
tion when employing labour. Therefore the wage (y) paid by the firm depends on the 
number of people employed within the firm, which leads to the following function of 
labour supply:
y=y(W)                                                              (1.2)
It is assumed that the slope of this function is greater than zero.
The firm buys its  machines at the market price and is a competitor within this  market. 
The number of machines the firm acquires is  fixed in the short-run, given that the firm 
already determined its  size. Therefore the firm can maximise its profits (p) by varying 
the labour it employs. It is  assumed that the firm sells its textiles in a competitive 
market, therefore the following profit function arises:
p = P‧X – y(W)W – mĀ                                                 (1.3)
20
30 Blair and Harrison (1993)p.36
31 Blair and Harrison (1993)p. 36-37
In this equation P is the price per textile, m the price per machine and Ā the fixed 
amount of machines the firm acquires. 
In order to maximise profits the firm will increase the number of employees as long 
as the marginal effect on p is zero. This is  the case when the first partial derivative of 
the profit function W is equal to zero:
∂p / ∂W = P ‧ ∂X / ∂W - ( y(W) + W dy(W) / dW) = 0                               (1.4)
When examining this equation in detail, ∂X / ∂W demonstrates the change in output 
when increasing labour by one unit, which is  defined as the marginal product of la-
bour (MPL). Since P is the price for textiles, P multiplied by ∂X / ∂W is the value of 
the additional output given to the change in labour, which is  defined as the value of 
the marginal product of labour (VMPL). 
As noted before, the slope of the supply of labour y(W) is positive. In the event that 
the firm hires one additional employee, it must pay a higher wage. It is noteworthy 
that the firm has to pay this higher wage not only to the additional worker, but also 
to all other employees. Hence hiring one more employee has two effects. First, the 
new employee receives y(W), the wage equal to what the others receive. It does 
not consider the increase in wage yet. Second, the income (W) that the other em-
ployees receive is  increased by dy(W) / dW, which accounts for the increase in 
wage due to the additional worker. 
Therefore the last part of equation (1.4), ( y(W) + W dy(W) / dW) demonstrates the 
costs caused by one additional worker and is therefore called the marginal factor 
cost of labour (MFCL). Thus the equation (1.4) can be rewritten as the following:
∂p / ∂W = VMPL - MFCL = 0                                               (1.5) 
In order to maximise its  profits the firm increases the number of employees  until 
VMPL  equals MFCL. 
2.3.1.2 Implications on welfare and price trough monopsony power32
Assuming the firm would act like a competitor and hire employees at the equilibrium it 
would hire q1 employees and pay a wage of y1 as demonstrated in Figure (2). Con-
sumer surplus is equal to the area fcy1, producer surplus equal to acy1. However the 
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firm does not act like a competitor in the labour market, therefore stops  hiring em-
ployees at the point where MFCL exceeds VMPL, as the firm maximises profits when 
MFCL is equal to VMPL, as  illustrated in Figure (2). VMPL is equal to the demand 
curve within the equilibrium. So the firm is maximising profit when it employs labour 
at q2, which is  at the intersection of MFCL and the demand curve. Hiring labour at q2 
is optimal for the firm, but decreases social welfare.
Therefore as demonstrated in Figure (2), producer surplus decreases by y1cby2, but 
the firm attains an additional surplus equal to the difference between the area y1dby2 
and ecd. Furthermore a dead-weight loss equal to the area ecb  evolves. Hence, if a 
firm has monopsony power, too few resources are applied, which entails a general 
loss in social welfare and second, part of the lost producer surplus is  passed on to 
the firm‘s (consumer) surplus. 
Figure 2: Monopolistic welfare losses
Source: Blair, R.D. and Harrison J.L.(1993)p.38
2.3.1.3 Can monopsony power be beneficial to final consumers?33
The above model on monopsony by Blair R.D. and Harrison J.L.(1993) reveals  that 
monopsony power of buyers  in a market has negative effects on suppliers and on 
social welfare. Nevertheless it is often argued that exempt from buyers, final con-
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sumers do benefit likewise. Because the price savings a monopsonist obtains, are 
passed on. This  implicates lower prices to final consumers. This assumption seems 
reasonable at first sight, but in fact is refused as shown by Blair R.D. and Harrison 
J.L.(1993) in the following section, when comparing a monopsonist in contrast to a 
firm under competitive circumstances.34
As illustrated in equation (1.5) a monopsonist‘s  ideal level of hiring employees is 
where the marginal factor cost of labour (MFCL) is equal to the value of the mar-
ginal product of labour (VMPL). Given that MFCL is  the product of price (P) times 
the marginal product of labour (MPL) the following equation results: 
     P * MPL  = MFCL                                                                   (1.6)
By rearranging this equation the following arises:
P = MFCL /MPL                                                                      (1.7)
Basic economic theory demonstrates that in a competitive market a firm‘s output 
level is  set where output price (P) equals  marginal cost of production. Therefore the 
monopsonist‘s marginal cost of production is equal to MFCL /MPL as illustrated in 
equation (1.7). 
A firm acting not only in a competitive output market but also in a competitive input 
(labour) market faces in contrast to the monopsonist, a fixed wage rate irrespective 
of the number of people hired. Therefore the MFC is ceaseless and equal to the 
wage rate (y). Further P * MPL = y, which denotes  that the firm is hiring employees 
as long as the additional market value of output due to increased labour is  higher 
than the wage rate (y). By remodelling this, the following equation results:
P = y / MPL                                                            (1.8)
As illustrated in Figure (2), MFCL is greater than the input (labour) price a monop-
sonist faces, namely MFCL is  larger than y. Thus the marginal cost of a firm with 
monopsony power is higher than that of a firm without, therefore: 
MFCL /MPL > w / MPL                                                                    (1.9)
Whereby the left-hand side represents the marginal cost of the monopsonist, the 
right-hand side the marginal cost of a firm without monopsony power.
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Due to the fact that marginal costs are crucial to determine a firm‘s  output level, the 
monopsonist will reduce its output level, relative to the firm without monopsony 
power. But the reduction in output level of this  one monopsonistic firm will have no 
effect on overall competition in the output market. Therefore the monopsonist will 
set his output price equal to that of a firm without monopsony power, namely at the 
market price. According to this, price savings due to monopsony power are not re-
layed to consumers. 35
The above model of monopsony is  very useful to best describe the implications of 
monopsony power and even though it is exemplified on the labour market, the model 
is  applicable on the product market, which is  more appropriate when analysing buyer 
power in retailing. Therefore the model will be continued with regard to the product 
market, namely where the input market consists of products instead of labour. This 
means that from now on the firm has monopsony power in buying units  of input, in-
stead of hiring employees.  
2.3.2 The Monemporist
The term “monemporist“36 is used to describe a firm who is a monopsonist in the in-
put market and a monopolist in the output market. 
One assumption, made due to the fact of dealing with products in the input market, is 
that the firm uses the input product in final stages of production to accomplish the 
product. Hence demand is referred to as ‘derived demand‘ (dD) or average (net) 
value (revenue) product of the factor (AVP) as illustrated in Figure (3).37 
Due to the additional monopoly position of the monopsonist in the output market, the 
derived demand curve (dD) is  downward sloping which leads  to the marginal revenue 
product (MRP) of input. The monemporist maximises his  profit at the intersection of 
MFC and MRP, which lies below the competitive equilibrium, whereby price is  equal 
to y3 and quantitiy reduces to q3. The grey-shaded area in Figure (3) illustrates the 
dead-weight loss resulting from an additional monopoly postition in the output mar-
ket. This reveals that besides  a firm‘s monopsony power in the input market, a mo-
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nopoly position in the output market reinforces its position within the market which 
leads to an additional loss in social welfare.38
Figure 3: Additional Welfare Losses from an Monemporist
Source: Dobson P., M. Waterson and A. Chu (1998)p.12 
To summarise, a monopsony is  characterised by a buyer‘s ability to reduce input 
prices below the competitive equilibrium, by lowering the overall quantity demanded, 
whereas a monopoly is defined by a seller‘s ability to increase prices by restricting 
quantity supplied. In both cases the market is losing in total quantity traded in relation 
to the competitive market, therefore the market is  no longer allocatively efficient. Un-
like often assumed, lower input prices obtained through monopsony power do not re-
sult in lower prices in the output market. As a matter of fact if a buyer, besides being 
a monopsonist, has monopoly power in the output market, lower input prices turn into 
higher output prices.39
But a monopsony can have natural reasons as well. In some industries it may be 
most functional to allow only one buyer within the market, by reason that resources 
are best employed, even though welfare and dead-weight losses arise. As  well, buyer 
cartels are founded due to cost-efficiency. Especially in retailing, where buyer groups 
are not rare, competition authorities view them critically. Moreover, so far the discus-
25
38 Dobson, Waterson and Chu (1998)p.12-13
39 Blair and Harrison (1993)p. 42
sion was mainly concerned with static welfare, so the question arises, to what extent 
will buyer power have an effect in the long run? As producers feel impelled to lower 
prices to further compete within the market, their profit decreases. Thus it is more dif-
ficult for suppliers  to undertake new investments, which in turn results in lower quality 
and decreased consumer variety as less money is spent on product engineering and 
innovation.40  Having a market where one part is totally dependent on one single 
buyer is always problematic.41 
2.3.3 Oligopoly & Oligopsony
So far we were primarily dealing with monopsony. However as Figure (1) suggests, 
there are apart from monopsony, other market structures to consider important in 
terms of buyer power, for instance oligopsony. The difference between the two lies in 
the number of firms acting on the demand side. Oligopsony is  characterised by many 
suppliers, like monopsony, but more than one buyer on the demand side.
In order to exert buyer power under oligopsony the following three criteria are 
essential:42
I. The buyersʻ purchase volume is significant in the market
II. Entering the market on the demand side is difficult
III. The slope of the supply curve is positive
If these conditions are fulfilled, the theory of oligopoly is applied to examine oligop-
sony, as well as  the theory of monopoly is  adapted to assess monopsony, as per 
statement above. Under an oligopsony the deviation from the competitive equilibrium 
in terms of price and quantity is highest, when the number of buyers  involved in the 
market is lowest. As  it is the case in a market characterised by dominant buyers, the 
more powerful one single buyer is in terms of market share and control, the greater 
his potential to push prices below the market equilibrium.43  
In an oligopoly, firms are interested in their rivals‘ actions and choose their strategies 
accordingly, because the strategy one firm pursues, affects the success of the other 
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and vice versa. In this  context a strategy is referred to the output or the price set by a 
firm. Under perfect competition things are different as the market price is assumed to 
be exogenously determined, therefore the strategy of an individual firm can be 
ignored.44 
Game theory helps to explain the way decisions are taken by oligopolistic firms. For 
this  reason, the basics will be explained by taking the example of a duopoly (an oli-
gopoly consisting of two firms) and giving the profit matrix for these two rival firms A 
and B for one period as illustrated in Figure (4).45 
               Figure 4: Profit Matrix (given in € millions)
                  based on: Perloff, J. M. (2007), Microecnomics p.423
Both firms try to maximise their profits, but as their strategic decisions influence each 
other, one firm can only be better off if the other firm is  worse off. Firms A and B can 
choose between an output level of 70 or 50 units. Each firm who decides to produce 
the higher output level can either earn a profit of € 21 million or € 31 million, as  well 
as  with the lower output level either € 18 million or € 26 million, depending on the 
other firm‘s output strategy. Neither firm A nor firm B knows of the other firm‘s  strat-
egy, because both firms make their decisions simultaneously. The situation both firms 
are faced with is referred to a “noncooperative game of imperfect information.“46 
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Even though the firms  don‘t know about the other firm‘s output decision, both firms 
will choose an output level where output equals 70, as profits are relatively higher, 
regardless of the other firm‘s  output strategy. Furthermore qA=qB=70 presents a 
Nash equilibrium, given that both firms would not change their strategies, even if they 
would know of the other firm‘s output decision beforehand as their profit does not in-
crease by changing to the lower output level .47
The most efficient strategy for both firms is to produce an output level of 50 
(qA=qB=50), as both firms would earn a profit equal to € 26 million. In order to 
achieve that both firms follow this strategy, firms A and B have to co-operate and 
therefore trust each other. But both firms face a  prisoners‘ dilemma, whereby each 
firm has an incentive to cheat on the other as profits would increase to € 31 million by 
doing so. None of the two firms can be sure that the other will adhere to the contract, 
therefore they only collude if they have the possibility to punish the other firm in case 
of deception. However, in a single-period game that is not the case. Therefore firms 
collude in a multi-period game where the end can‘t be predicted as the following ex-
ample shows.48
Let us assume firms A and B are in a multi-period game where the end of the game is 
unknown. Both firms agree to co-operate and produce 50 units of output and conse-
quently both firms earn € 26 million each period. In case firm A cheats  on firm B (or 
vice versa) and produces 70 units instead, firm B will punish firm A by producing 70 
units in all of the following periods, which decreases the profit from € 26 million to € 
21 million. In case the end of the game is known, the situation in the last period is the 
same as  in the single-period game, as the incentive to cheat is  high since the fraudu-
lent firm can‘t be punished thereafter.49  The above examples show to some extent 
why firms collude and form cartels.
2.3.4 Bilateral market power
If we take another look at Figure (1) we find that market power can be present on 
both sides of the market, therefore we call them bilateral. The most significant case is 
bilateral monopoly, where one buyer, who is  a monopolist in his output market, is 
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faced by a monopolist in his input market. This  case is  examined by extending Figure 
(3). Previously we saw that the competitive equilibrium is where derived demand 
(AVP) and the supply curve intersect, whereby the supply curve is  equal to marginal 
costs (MC). Furthermore we defined MFC and MRP, the former being the upward 
sloping supply, the latter the downward sloping demand curve. Now two more curves 
arise in our graph in Figure (5), namely the average cost curve (AC) and MMRP, 
which is marginal to MRP. MRP arises due to the monopsonist‘s additional monopoly 
in selling his output (monempory), whereas MMRP demonstrates the situation of a 
bilateral monopoly. The difference between the two is that in a bilateral monopoly, the 
single buyer has no monopsony power, as the seller holds a monopoly position, eve-
rything else being equal.50
Figure 5: Bilateral Market power
Source: Clarke, R., S. Davies, P. Dobson and M. Waterson (2002)p. 16
Now the market is characterised by a powerful supply and demand side. At first we 
will consider the situation where both sides do not act in conjunction. Hence either 
the buyer dominates and establishes the price first and the seller ascertains  the 
quantity thereupon (monopsony outcome), or the seller dominates and sets price first 
and the buyer acts as in a competitive market (monopoly outcome) where MC is 
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equal to MMRP. Therefore the seller sets the price at q4 and quantity equals  y4 as 
illustrated in Figure (5).51
Thus one part defines the price the other has to comply with. Now we assume that 
buyer and supplier are conscious of their interrelation and co-operate, therefore they 
first set quantity before they determine the price together. The optimal quantity for the 
single buyer and the single supplier is  at the intersection of MC and MRP, given as 
q*. However the price lies  in between H and L as illustrated in Figure (5). This implies 
that the price has to be above the supplier‘s average costs (AC) and beneath the 
buyer‘s  average value product (AVP), as H represents the price the buyer and L the 
price the seller just breaks even. Hence the price is an outcome of the two parties‘ 
bargaining.52
The output q* is Pareto efficient for the two monopolists, but although it is  higher than 
q3 and q4, it is not necessarily better in terms of social welfare. It is important to no-
tice that on the one hand a monopolist buyer reduces quantity beneath the competi-
tive level to maximise profits, but on the other hand he can still realise profits when 
output equals q5 where AVP and AC meet, given in Figure (5).53
After analysing the different structures of markets, it seems obvious that none of 
them has beneficial effects on welfare, contrariwise we could only find detrimental 
effects. As well, the argument that monopsony power can be beneficial to final con-
sumers was rejected as the lower prices received by intermediate buyers are not 
passed on to final consumers.54 In oligopolistic and bilateral markets there is a high 
incentive to co-operate even if collusion is complex as the involved firms  have to be 
prevented from cheating on each other and anti-competitive laws and governments 
prohibit cartels.
So far we considered only market structures when analysing buyer power. The num-
ber of participants acting in a market is crucial for the emergence of buyer power, but 
there exist other sources  of buyer power, which we referred to as bargaining power 
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before. In the following the emphasis  lies on strategic actions, taken by powerful 
buyers to exert power.
3. Strategic Buyer Behaviour
There exist different practices taken by buyers to exert power. These are divided into 
the following ten categories. The practices are concerned with various sources of 
bargaining power, whether it be anti-competitive by squeezing competition out of The 
market, areal in terms of land use planning and concentration, monetary by charging 
illegitimate fees or shifting rents, among others. The practices described in the follow-
ing are rather representative than complete. 55
Category 1: Slotting allowances
Slotting allowances represent fees paid by suppliers  to have their product placed in 
the store shelves. But not all suppliers are asked for slotting allowances. As some 
products are indispensable for supermarkets to store, only certain suppliers  have to 
pay in order to have their products placed. The amount depends on various factors 
and is usually based on an agreement between the supplier and retailer. Suppliers 
introducing new products are very likely to pay slotting allowances. It is argued by 
retailers  that the success of the product is uncertain as well as products placed at 
eye level or on special display are charged in exchange. There seem to be no clear 
rules why some suppliers are charged with slotting allowances and others are not. 
Even though slotting allowances are not generally illegal, their existence is 
controversial.56 
Category 2: Exclusive Distribution 
By closing a sole or exclusive distribution contract, retailers are provided with special 
distribution rights. This practice is related to conditional purchase, described within 
the next category.57 
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Category 3:Conditional purchase behaviour
Retailers using this  strategy purchase only if a supplier guarantees substantial con-
cessions to them. This can be devastating to suppliers‘ viability, especially if the re-
tailer accounts for a significant proportion of their sales. Therefore they often have to 
lower the prices in order to comply with retailers‘ conditions, since their alternatives 
are limited. Frequently retailers induce this exclusive position by imposing conditions 
on suppliers, which prevent them from selling to others. Food manufacturers reported 
on cases in which supermarkets  conditioned their purchase on the fact that manufac-
turers  would not supply discounters with their products. Retailers  deny these inci-
dents. However, it is  noteworthy since not only suppliers but also discounters are 
affected.58 
Category 4: Exclusivity contracts
The question arises why suppliers engage in exclusive contracts  with buyers, as de-
scribed in Category 2 and 3. One reason can be taken from literature, whereby 
manufacturers induce exclusive terms in order to restrict competition which allows 
higher downstream prices, beneficial to both parties. Another reason may be due to 
vertical externalities, occurring from extensive autonomous behaviour. Therefore, 
suppliers may accept exclusive contracts for their own advantages. Furthermore, re-
tailers lure suppliers  by offering exclusive contracts under good conditions at first but 
alter conditions to their advantage within time.59 
Category 5: Cloning behaviour
In general, trademarks  are legally protected from being copied by others. However, 
this  protection is not sufficient from keeping others, especially retailers, to clone or 
copy products. In recent years the number of own-labelled products by retailers in-
creased, as well as  the retailers‘ capability to design products very close to the 
original.60 Consequently, the retailer is becoming a direct competitor to the manufac-
turer of the original product, which is either positive or negative for consumers. 
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On the one hand, store-brands alternatively offer to consumers a supplement at 
lower prices. On the other hand manufacturers‘ incentive to invest in product devel-
opment and innovations is  reduced as retailers are likely to copy them soon after. 
Therefore consumers  may face less  product innovations in the future. Retailers have 
major advantages in competing with other manufacturers, since they benefit from a 
double role: being a supplier and selling to final consumers. In contrast to sole manu-
facturers, they have additional access to valuable information. In their role as retailer 
they are provided with facts about consumers‘ habits and preferences by means of 
loyalty cards and other marketing tools, plus their role as buyer keeps them updated 
on product innovations. Besides price and information advantages, retailers  can fa-
vour own-labelled products by supporting them with better shelf-placement.61 
Category 6: Joint marketing
A retailer and manufacturer may engage in joint marketing to improve their sales, 
which may be beneficial for them individually, but not in general terms. Within a joint 
marketing program, as for instance commodity bundling, joint promotion, special dis-
counting or a special joint advertising campaign, a manufacturer presumably pro-
vides the retailer with unique privileges which are not offered to others. This  gives the 
retailer a certain advantage against others, since retailers compete with heterogene-
ous products.62
Category 7: Predatory buying of inputs 
Sellers  may attempt to lower prices to push rivals out of the market, since they fail to 
compete in the long-run. Analogously buyers, such as retailers, may follow a cost-
raising strategy. Thereby a retailer extends her purchase-level significantly, where-
upon competitors drop out of the market, since they can not compete in this market 
anymore. Their costs  would rise to an exorbitant dimension and become unbearable. 
This  strategy has  most impact on markets  where scarce resources such as skilled 
labour or quality raw materials are utilised, as alternative or substitute inputs for pro-
duction are limited. But the signal, this strategy entails  appears even more effective 
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than the strategy itself. It does not only result in fewer market participants  but also 
alienates potential market entrants.63
Category 8: Strategic purchasing of facilities  
A supermarket or store in general represents the key facility of distribution in retailing. 
Therefore the fragmentation and density of stores among retailers within an area is 
an important factor for a supplier‘s  success, since manufacturers  face limited alterna-
tives to switch to another retailer when the market is dominated by only one or a few 
retailers. Nowadays the hypermarket is  the dominant store format, hence it is the 
main key facility of distribution to sell products to the end consumer, and the epitome 
of concentration. This affects not only manufacturers as they may see themselves 
captured by a single retailer, but also competition among retailers. In this context the 
role of the first-mover becomes vitally important, as planning controls  often restrict 
the construction of new stores  for environmental reasons. Hence, being the first to 
open up a market within an area or discovering well-situated sites for new stores en-
tails a major advantage and a certain source of power to retailers.64
Category 9: Reciprocal dealing
Reciprocal dealing is based on an agreement between a seller and a monopsonistic 
buyer, whereby the seller undertakes to purchase again from the buyer. This may en-
tail economies of scale as the buyer engages in the input market of his  own seller. 
For instance, the wholesale department of a conglomerate firm purchases from a 
processed food factory, which in turn buys its inputs  from the conglomerate 
firm.65This leads to an increased interdependence within a market and more room for 
imperfect market conditions. 
Category 10: Terms of business
Most of the terms and conditions between a buyer and seller are agreed on in a con-
tract. However, in most industries some unwritten rules and norms exist, which are 
adopted and become generally accepted in the course of time. These so called 
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‘standard terms of business‘66  for instance, are generally applied methods of pay-
ment or the sharing of promotional expenses between the two parties. Depending on 
their relevance and acceptance within the industry, these terms can either be positive 
or negative for the involved.67 
Whether these practices  are harmful or not to consumers  depends mostly on factors 
such as competition in the down-stream market and concentration among retailers. In 
a competitive down-stream market, retailers are likely to pass cost advantages on to 
final consumers in spite of strategic practices, whereas in a market with a limited 
number of retailers, strategic actions may add to reduced competition, create barriers 
to entry and facilitate collaboration among retailers. On the other side the practices 
may lead to increased efficiency by means of lower costs to consumers and higher 
service and product quality. Therefore it varies from case to case whether the prac-
tices are considered harmful or beneficial to consumers.68 
An investigation of the UK grocery market in 2000 by the Competition Commission69 
(CC) gives some insights into the impact of practices on the relationship between 
suppliers  and retailers. Suppliers were asked to report on practices retailers em-
ployed and, despite of multiple accusations from the suppliers‘ side, it was  challeng-
ing to get more detailed information, as suppliers  feared to be punished by retailers  if 
they disclosed too much information. Hence, the CC sent a list, including 52 prac-
tices70 suppliers had complained about to retailers. These in turn were asked to state 
whether they engaged in those practices within the past five years or not. The first 24 
practices were random and the others  divided into groups like contractual arrange-
ments, delistings, intermediaries, prices, product specifications, and suppliers‘ contri-
butions to marketing/promotional activities. Retailers were asked, for instance, if they 
demanded payments or price reductions from suppliers which were not cost-related; 
made alterations of terms of contracts without adequate notification in advance, re-
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sulting in additional costs for suppliers; charged suppliers for displaying or placing 
their product at all; conditioned their purchase on the duration of the credit period 
suppliers agreed on or accomplished delistings in favour of own-label products. 
The CC found that the utilisation of 27 of these practices by retailers holding a market 
share of more than 8 percent of grocery resale has detrimental effects  on competition 
and holds potential for another way of constituting to a monopoly. Hence, they sug-
gested that an obligatory Code of Practice for the major retailers would be most ade-
quate to get things  under control.71 However, the success of the Code has been con-
troversial.
4. Indicators of buyer power
4.1 Buyer Concentration 
As mentioned before, buyer power mostly occurs in markets in which a few buyers 
dominate the demand side. Therefore, buyer concentration is an indicator of buyer 
power. But a high buyer concentration does not entail that buyers  actually exert 
power, even though chances are high that they do so.72 
There are several indicators of buyer concentration, hence it can be ambiguous to 
which we refer. In the glossary of statistical terms by the OECD we find that ‘Concen-
tration refers to the extent to which a small number of firms or enterprises account for 
a large proportion of economic activity such as total sales, assets or employment.‘73
Buyer concentration can be measured by relating the number of buyers  with the per-
centage of sales  of a good, they are responsible for. For instance, 5 buyers buy 50 
percent of the total amount of a good. Since this  indicator is  not hard to calculate and 
of informative nature, it has practical relevance. However, it is not always one-to-one 
comparable as  the percentage accounting for the sale of a product is chosen 
randomly.74 
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For instance, in general 10 buyers  accounting for 50 percent of purchases is not 
alarming, whereas 5 buyers could indicate a high buyer concentration. Furthermore, 
it is essential to consider the percentage each firm accounts for individually, since 10 
firms may account for 50 percent of purchases all together, but the leading firm may 
be in charge of 40 percent and the remaining nine firms share the residual 10 percent 
of purchase. Hence, size inequalities among firms are worth of attention, but there is 
no rule of how to combine both measures.75   
Another well known indicator of buyer concentration is the five-firm buyer concentra-
tion ratio, which summarises the market share of the five largest firms on the buying 
side of a market. That is not to say that a number other than five firms is unconceiv-
able, but it is rather unusual as  the five-firm buyer concentration (BCR5) is most ap-
plicable. Thus, for instance, if the largest five firms each account for 22 percent, 15 
percent, 9 percent, 6 and 4 percent, then the BCR5 is  equal to 56 percent. As the 
former indicator, the BCR5 does not involve complex calculations and is  of a visceral 
nature.76
Other indicators of buyer concentration include the Herfindahl index, which is defined 
as  ‘A measure of industry concentration. The value of the index is the sum of the 
squares of the market shares of all firms in an industry. Higher values indicate 
greater concentration.‘77 It is  generally applied to measure concentration on the sup-
ply side, but can be applied within this context as well. However, it is more elaborate 
to calculate and less intuitive than other measures.78 
4.2 Elasticity of supply 
It is argued that within a monopsony, buyer power, given as  the difference a buyer is 
inclined to pay for a product and the price he actually pays, is the inverse of the elas-
ticity of supply. In turn, the inverse of the elasticity of supply is referred to as the BPI 
or the buying power index. The distinction from other indicators is  that the index 
measures to which extent buyers influence the market, whereas size is subordinate. 
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It may be not clear at first sight that the inverse elasticity of supply is a measure for 
buyer power. However, it is  argued that in a market with a perfectly elastic supply, 
even a sole buyer with a dominant position facing no competitors  is incapable of ex-
ercising power due to limited supply. Alternatively, the more imperfect elastic supply 
is  within a market, the greater  the monopsonist‘s ability to exert buying power. Since 
the monopsonist is able to lower purchase prices by restricting demand, he can ob-
tain overstated earnings.79 
However, the BPI faces  several drawbacks. Unlike the BCR, it is challenging to cal-
culate the elasticity of supply for a real market, therefore the BPI is less applicable in 
reality. Another disadvantage is  its appropriability, as it is  mainly adequate in 
monopolistic-like markets and becomes more complex and restricted in its utilisation 
within other market structures. Nevertheless, it can provide pivotal information on 
buyer power, therefore it should not be underestimated.80 
4.3 Performance Measures
Another approach to buyer power is by investigating performance-related indicators, 
such as price-cost margins. Even though they are no determinants for buyer power, 
they may assist to indicate buyer power and lead to further investigations.81
The price-cost margin, the difference between the price a buyer is willing to pay and 
the price he actually pays, is important since in a monopsonistic model it can be in-
dicative of a monopsonist‘s buyer power. It is assumed that the higher the price-cost 
margin a monopsonist earns, the more buyer power he exerts. Therefore, price-cost 
margins can be indicative for buyer power as they may reveal some information on 
the extent of discounts or the value of other terms buyers receive from suppliers. 
However, the drawbacks of price-cost margins as indicators for buyer power are that, 
first of all, it is  difficult to obtain the relevant information to calculate them. Second, 
their implications  can be interpreted in various ways. On the one hand, it is argued 
that buyers increase price-cost margins by lowering prices by means of buyer power, 
but on the other hand high price-cost margins may indicate lower costs  due to effi-
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ciency reasons  such as buying in bulk. Thus, high price-cost margins are not a priori 
undesirable. However, buyers or retailers  exerting power on both sides of the market, 
namely as buyers  and resellers, may exert buyer power to lower prices on the one 
side, but do not pass these cost advantages on to final consumers. Consequently 
high price-cost margins can be good indicators for buyer power, but their sources 
may be diverse.82
4.4 Market definition
The previous  indicators assist competition authorities, researchers and others to 
measure buyer power. However, another important factor is to define the market 
upon which the indicators should be applied. Therefore, we deal with market defini-
tion in the following:
A market can be defined by various  factors depending on the purpose of its  definition. 
In our context, two factors are essential to determine a market: the geographical 
scope the market is  located in and the existence of substitutes. Additionally, the defi-
nition varies depending on the selling or buying side of the market. On the selling 
side, typically, several stores are located within an area that is within easy reach for 
consumers; the market is therefore sub-state. On the buying side the market defini-
tion can be extended towards a more national or international market. However, spe-
cific brands or products demanded by consumers may delimit the market. Further-
more, local suppliers may depend on regional retailers, particularly if long-term 
agreements are a common practice.83
To define a market one can adhere to the following definition in which the majority of 
‘... customers would switch to readily available substitutes or to suppliers located 
elsewhere in response to a hypothetical small permanent relative price increase to 
the products and areas being considered.‘84 Since customers would buy in other ar-
eas or switch to other products, the price increase is ineffective, even detrimental to 
the seller (retailer). However, the market definition is complete when the previous 
definition is inverted. Namely, when the majority of customers remains with the seller 
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despite a price increase, which leads to higher profits for the seller. An example 
would be if all retailers for electronic products within a sub-area increase prices by 
one-fifth to one-tenth, but  customers still adhere to those sellers and do not seek to 
find others at lower prices. Then the market is defined. However, in case the majority 
of customers seeks to find lower prices in other sub-areas, the definition of the mar-
ket has to be extended until the increase in prices  would become profitable for 
retailers.85 
Defining a market by a hypothetical price increase, as  the previous example demon-
strates, is also known as the SSNIP (Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in 
Prices) Test or Hypothetical monopolist test. The test was adopted by the US de-
partment of Justice and became internationally accepted.86
The OFT states:
‘In essence the test seeks to establish the smallest product group (and geographical  area) such 
that a hypothetical monopolist controlling that product group (in that area) could profitably sus-
tain 'supra competitive' prices, i.e. prices that are at least a small but significant amount above 
competitive levels. That product group (and area) is usually the relevant market.‘87 
Beside the geographical and substitute component, consumer habits are also essen-
tial to define a market. In the food sector, European countries mostly differ from each 
other in terms of  consumer habits  and preferences. Therefore, the markets  are more 
national than international. However, national markets are probably oversized if we 
refer to the market definition of the OFT. Hence, it would be more adequate to divide 
them into sub-regional markets. But national data are easier to access than sub-
regional data. Thus, national markets are practically more relevant, even though re-
sults may be distorted and buyer concentration undervalued.88 
Another important factor is  whether discount and convenience stores are included in 
the definition or left out. In several European countries, discount stores developed 
within recent years towards the more traditional supermarket, hence, discount stores 
are included. Convenience stores, on the other hand, are left out as  they rather serve 
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for top-up than one-stop shopping and their customers seem to be less sensitive to 
price changes.89 
So far we considered the market definition on the selling side. The market definition 
on the buying side differs by the parties directly involved, since suppliers‘ actions are 
relevant instead of consumers‘. However, needless to say that consumers‘ actions 
are always essential. Now let us assume that a buyer who is active as reseller de-
creases purchase prices of his suppliers by one-fifth to one-tenth. If sufficient suppli-
ers  subsequently stop providing the buyer with their products, his product range will 
be significantly reduced. Consequently, the buyer‘s  profits decrease as fewer con-
sumers seek to buy at his stores. Instead of increased profits, the buyer incurs losses 
from decreasing suppliers‘ prices. In this case the market definition has to be ex-
tended and similar buyers have to be included, until suppliers sell their products de-
spite a decrease in prices. 
It is  remarkable that final consumers again take a major part in defining the market. 
Retail buyers are affected the most by suppliers‘ delivery stop, when they fail to store 
those products heavily demanded by consumers. An example for the market defini-
tion on the buying side would be an Italian retailer for designer clothes who demands 
a price reduction from its suppliers within a special region. Due to the price reduction, 
a majority of suppliers  stop providing this  retailer with the clothing they manufacture. 
This  in turn makes the price reduction unprofitable for the retailer, since his product 
range is significantly reduced and less consumers seek to buy in his stores. In this 
case the market definition has to be extended and similar clothing retailers have to 
be included. Consequently if the Italian retailer then retains sufficient suppliers de-
spite cutting prices, the definition of the market is accomplished.90   
However, theory and practice differ from each other. In the food industry for instance, 
the bigger manufacturers operate across borders. Still, retailers mostly negotiate with 
national affiliates  and the geographic market is therefore assumed to be national 
across Europe. Although under certain circumstances it is  rather adequate to take the 
European market as  benchmark. Another important factor to consider is which prod-
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ucts to exclude or include in the market definition. A retailer has to store a number of 
products in order to be considered well-assorted. Whether products such as fresh 
food, detergents, cosmetics, alcohol etc, are included or excluded from the market 
definition varies across nations.91
In conclusion it is assumed that in the food industry the market definition on the sell-
ing side as well as on the buying side is  rather national with some exceptions. Con-
venience stores are left out, but traditional supermarkets, hypermarkets and dis-
counters are included on the selling side. Furthermore the definition implies house-
hold goods and beverages.92    
5.The real world
So far we were concerned with the principles of buyer power. The theory of micro-
economics demonstrated its impact on welfare with regard to different market struc-
tures. We investigated strategic practices, utilised by retailers to extend their market 
power or even establish a dominant position in the market. Moreover, we identified 
the indicators of buyer power and demonstrated how a market is defined in theory. 
The theoretical concept of buyer power may not be fully applicable in practice, since 
the overall picture of an economy or a market is  difficult to investigate in theory. 
Therefore, the following section provides essential information on real markets and 
whether the theoretical concept of buyer power holds in practice. Hence, we will in-
vestigate decisions by the European Commission (EC) on mergers in recent years. 
This  should be a key moment while reading the thesis, as it reveals background de-
tails on markets, after a detailed discussion on theoretical principles. Furthermore a 
discussion on recent food price developments in Austria indicates how buyer power 
or a highly concentrated market can possibly influence a market. 
5.1 European Commission in Merger Cases
Before going into detail on decisions made by the EC, it is essential to clarify the role 
of mergers in terms of competition and the competencies of the EC in this respect. 
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When two or more firms merge, the effects on the economy vary depending on the 
case. On the one hand a merger may enhance economic efficiency by reducing costs 
through economies of scale or by the development of new products. However, on the 
other side a merger can have detrimental effects  on competition. By combining re-
sources, firms may reinforce their market power and obtain a dominant position in the 
market. Consequently, consumers may face higher prices, lower quality and reduced 
choice, since competitors, unable to compete in such a market, were driven out.93   
Therefore, in general competition authorities have to approve a merger prior to being 
accomplished. In case more than one EU member is involved or the firms‘ consoli-
dated annual sales revenue is above a certain limit, the case is directed to the EC. 
Furthermore, it is verified whether the merger can be permitted or not. However, in 
case the annual sales revenue does not exceed the limit, national competition 
authorities investigate the relevant cases. Some mergers, however, may be investi-
gated by the EC even though national authorities are responsible for them.94
5.2 The decision on Rewe/Meinl
The following case is based on numbers and information related to the EC decision 
on Febuary 3, 1999.95 The information given in the following is not up to date, since 
we refer to the time before the merger in the late nineties. Therefore, by writing in the 
present tense we are referring to the pre-merger period. Nevertheless, the purpose is 
to evaluate the merger decision of the EC in order to obtain information about the 
Austrian market. The Rewe/Meinl case was and still is of major importance not only 
for competition authorities but also in the food retailing industry. It sets an example in 
the history of food retailing and is  often referred to in similar cases. The investigation 
of this case therefore gives us valuable insights into the Austrian market and its dy-
namics. 
5.2.1 Rewe/Meinl
In August 1998 the German group Rewe announces its intention to acquire 100% 
shares of the Austrian retailer Julius Meinl AG. In 1996 Rewe, a major retailer and 
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wholesaler in the food industry, entered the Austrian market by the acquisition of BML 
(consistent of Billa, Merkur, Emma, and Mondo operating in food-retailing and 
drugstore-chain Bipa). The Julius Meinl AG (consistent of PamPam, Julius Meinl, Ju-
lius Meinl Gourmet and Jééé), a retailer of everyday consumer durables, does its op-
erations in Austria and to a small extent in Italy. It owns 341 stores, which are all in-
tended to be purchased by Rewe.96
Since the combined turnover of the two firms was above the threshold and the acqui-
sition of 100% Meinl shares was supposed to contribute significantly to the concen-
tration of the market, the EC was responsible for the investigation of the merger ac-
cording to Article 2 of the Merger Regulation.97 
5.2.2 The Evaluation under the Merger Regulation
The EC investigated the case on two different levels: the supply side (distribution 
market) and the demand side (procurement market) of the food retailers‘ market. On 
the supply side Rewe/Meinl acts as seller to the final consumer, whereas on the de-
mand side it purchases goods from manufacturers and producers. In the following, 
the market definition of the two firms involved in the merger will be identified.98  
5.2.3 The Distribution Market
5.2.3.1 Relevant Product Market
There is a distinct market in food-retailing, which includes all retailers stocking food 
and non-food items in super- and hypermarkets  in particular. Specialised shops such 
as bakeries or butchers, however, are excluded from this market definition. Even 
though Rewe and Meinl suggested to include them together with farmer‘s  markets 
and petrol-stations, the EC refused to do so. It found that those specialist shops 
could not be appropriate substitutes, as they do not satisfy the principle of one-stop-
shopping. Plus, the EC argued that 98% of customers  of specialised shops equally 
buy at supermarkets. Petrol-stations were also not included, since customers‘ inten-
tions to shop at a petrol station are different from shopping at a supermarket, be-
cause prices are significantly higher and the product range is substantially smaller. 
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The remaining question is whether discount stores are included in the market defini-
tion. The EC states that discount stores carry mostly unbranded products and offer 
reduced service, compared to the traditional retailers. Hence, it was  controversial 
whether discounters are direct competitors and should be included in the market. By 
all means, the EC argued that decisions would not be affected thereby.99
5.2.3.2 Relevant geographic market
The relevant market of Rewe, Meinl and also of competitors Spar, Löwa and ADEG is 
national. All retailers  operate all over Austria, even though their prevalence varies 
across regions. Spar is better established in the western part of Austria, whereas 
Rewe (Billa) is  more prevalent in the eastern part. Since the product range and prices 
do not vary significantly across the country, the market is assumed to be national.100 
5.2.3.3 Market shares
In Austria the two major retailers, Rewe and Spar hold together a market share of 
more than 60%. Table (4) illustrates  the market shares  of each retailer in Austria. The 
numbers indicate that a merger with Meinl would even increase Rewe‘s  market share 
and leave competitors behind.101 
Table4: Market Shares in Austrian Food-Retailing
Firm Market share with 
discount stores
Market share without 
discount stores
Rewe/Billa [27-33] % [33-38] %
Meinl [5-10] % [5-10] %
Spar [23-28] % [27-32] %
ADEG [8-13] % [10-15] %
Hofer [<15] %
Löwa [<10] % [<10] %
Others [<10] % [<10] %
Source: European Commission(1999)Commission Decision p.7
5.2.3.4 Strengths
As mentioned above, Rewe holds a strong position in the eastern part of Austria, as 
does Meinl. Therefore, a merger between the two parties would not only increase 
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Rewe‘s market share across the country but also reinforce its strong position in Vi-
enna, Lower Austria and the northern Burgenland in particular. However, those parts 
are of major importance, since a majority of the country‘s purchasing power rests 
within these regions, as Table (5) demonstrates.102 
Table5: Austria in 1999
Provinces Population density 
(per sq km)
Surface (sq km) Population
Burgenland 70 3 962 276 486
Vorarlberg 134 2 601 347 443
Salzburg 72 7 156 512 049
Carinthia 59 9 538 560 821
Tirol 53 12 640 665 773
Styria 72 16 401 1 183 146
Upper Austria  114 11 980 1 368 299
Lower Austria 80 19 186 1 532 920
Vienna 3 724 415 1 545 386
Austria TOTAL 95 83 879 7 992 323
Source: Statistik Austria, Interaktive Datenbank http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/index.html 
(accessed August 2009)
Prior to the merger application in 1999, Austria has an average population density of 
95 people (per sq km). However, Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland together 
have an average population density of 143 (per sq km). This indicates that the pur-
chase power is  higher within these regions than in the rest of Austria. Although the 
East covers only 30% of the total surface, still more than 41% of the total population 
lives within this region.  These numbers  do not include commuters, who are esti-
mated to 1.2 million collectively in Vienna, Lower Austria and Burgenland in 1991 and 
even increased until 2001.103 
The merger would lead to a market share of Rewe/Meinl in East-Austria, four times 
larger than its  largest competitor Spar. Plus, Rewe/Meinl would run more than twice 
as many stores within this area. Furthermore, the combined firm could increase its 
market share above 80% in Vienna, which may affect the entire market in Austria. 
Since a large proportion of the total turnover is  effected in Vienna, a retailer holding a 
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dominant position in this area could benefit in various ways. First, by exerting market 
power in the Viennese market, and second, by establishing a dominant position in 
other parts of Austria by means of resources acquired through its prevalent position 
in Vienna. However, Rewe and Meinl argue that Spar has a leading position in five of 
Austria‘s provinces. This is better on paper than in reality. Spar has a leading position 
mainly in rural areas, which are less populated. Therefore, the turnover in populous 
regions, such as Vienna is much higher due to a greater purchase power.104 
In food retailing, large store formats are essential for a retailer‘s success. A combined 
firm of Rewe and Meinl would run the majority of large outlets such as supermarkets 
and in particular hypermarkets. Consumers  favour these store formats since they re-
spond to their busy lifestyles. Large outlets offer greater convenience to customers 
through a one-stop-shopping opportunity, compared to smaller stores. Rewe already 
owns 66 hypermarkets (Merkur) in Austria. By acquiring Meinl, another 40 (PamPam) 
would be added, while competitors  Spar and Löwa operate 44 (Interspar) and 17 
(Magnet) hypermarkets. Therefore, Rewe/Meinl would own nearly three times as 
many hypermarkets as its largest competitor Spar. Furthermore, Rewe is the leading 
retailer in terms of average sales per square metre. Its Merkur hypermarkets  effectu-
ate nearly twice the number per square metre than Interspar. However, Rewe/Meinl 
argued that Interspar would be larger in size, therefore they could offer a wider prod-
uct range which gives them a major competitive advantage. Nonetheless, the EC 
could not find any evidence for this  argument. On the contrary the numbers indicate 
the reverse.105 
In food-retailing the location of a shop is not only crucial for consumers‘ convenience, 
hence retailers‘ turnover, but also for logistic handling. Consequently, the key loca-
tions are around urban centres, in shopping streets within city-centres, as well as in 
shopping centres and specialised supermarket centres. In urban areas, logistics may 
be impeded by high road traffic loads and restricted delivery periods. However, the 
47
104 European Commission(1999)Commission Decision Case NoIV/M.1221p.9-10
105 European Commission(1999)Commission Decision Case NoIV/M.1221p.10-11
costs of logistics in rural regions may outweigh, since the points of delivery are scat-
tered and some alpine valleys are hard to access.106 
Rewe already operates  66 stores in these key regions. By the acquisition of Meinl the 
number would rise to 106, whereas Spar operates 62, Hofer 47, Löwa 20 and ADEG 
5 stores in these key areas. Once again Rewe/Meinl would have a major advantage 
compared to its rivals, as it would occupy 40% of the vantaged locations. Besides, it 
may not be efficient to continue proceedings of all 341 Meinl shops and after a 
merger Rewe/Meinl would therefore convert some Meinl shops into its Bipa drug-
stores. Hence, competitors awaiting a share of the pie may be disappointed, since 
Rewe/Meinl would probably divest only a few shops.107 
Rewe and Meinl have another corporate advantage compared to Spar: their organ-
isational structure. Rewe and Meinl are chain store companies, therefore their shops 
are centrally organised. This gives  them the power to decide on important issues 
(e.g. advertising, product policy, prices) for their shops. However, only 30% of Spar‘s 
stores are centrally organised, the remaining 70% are mostly operated by independ-
ent traders. This may be an advantage for the trader as it provides him with a greater 
freedom of decision. Nevertheless, centrally organised retailers such as Rewe or 
Meinl face several advantages. First, they are more flexible, since they are better 
able to respond to changes by implementing regulations on a central level. Second, 
they are best qualified to introduce their own-labelled product range due to their great 
authority to issue orders. A retailer stocking his own-labelled products faces a com-
petitive advantage. Consumers use prices of branded-products  to compare the price-
quality ratio between stores. Hence, in order to attract customers, branded products 
are priced sharply. However this  cuts profits  from retailers, since the margin on these 
products is rather small. Consequently the advantage of own-labelled products is that 
customers do not have a one-to-one comparable product, since they are only avail-
able at this particular retailer. Therefore, consumers are less price-sensitive when it 
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comes to own-labelled products. In Austria, so far only Rewe could introduce its  own-
labelled product range at an upper price level.108 
According to the previous investigation of the distribution market, the merger assists 
the involved parties to obtain a dominant position in the market. There is a strong in-
terdependency between the supply side and the demand side of the market. The re-
tailer acts as intermediary between the final consumer and the manufacturer. There-
fore, it seems natural that a firm with a dominant position in selling goods  could pos-
sibly reinforce its  position in buying these goods and vice versa. However, the de-
mand side of the market will be investigated later on.109   
5.2.3.5 Future Outlook 
An important determinant of the degree of competition in a market is barriers to entry. 
If newcomers can access a market without major obstacles, the market has no or 
very low barriers to entry. Thus, it is  implied to be of competitive nature, since the 
prevailing firms may never obtain a monopolistic-like position as firms will always 
seek to enter the market. However, in Austria the food-retailing industry is  already 
highly concentrated and attempts of foreign firms to enter the market failed so far. 
Therefore, it is supposed that a merger between Rewe and Meinl would rather re-
duce than tighten competition among firms. Nevertheless, Rewe argues that there 
are still potential growth opportunities in the Austrian market, as  their own example 
shows: in recent years Rewe could set up 50 new stores and increase its market 
share from 5% to a total of 30%. However, none of its  competitors could establish 
new stores or increase their market share equally. Therefore it may be traced back to 
Rewe‘s already existing market power.
In addition, building authorities restrict the construction of new outlets  based on land-
use planning laws. 
5.2.3.6 Causality
The Commission conveyed its objections to the merger to the two firms involved. 
Their arguments thereupon were certainly not satisfying as the following demon-
strates. 
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One of the objectives of the EC is to maintain fairness and equality within a market. 
Especially in markets  with high barriers to enter, smaller firms may suffer under pow-
erful competitors, since those may seek to drive them out of the market by taking ad-
vantage of their position. However, it is in the EC‘s interest to support efficient firms 
and will not support smaller firms only for the sake of their survival.110One argument 
brought forward by the two parties is that Meinl would be too small to further compete 
in the market. Without the merger it would therefore drop out of the market. Moreo-
ver, in case of a public sale, Rewe would acquire most of Meinl‘s  stores. They argue 
that Rewe would be most adequate because of their common history and the geo-
graphic location of their shops. Additionally, according to Rewe, a merger with Rewe 
would have the least anti-competitive effect on the market.111
The EC considers the above arguments only if Rewe can prove the following:
I. without the merger Meinl has to file for bankruptcy   
II. without the merger Rewe would acquire Meinl anyway
III. a merger between Rewe and Meinl has the least anti-competitive effect on the 
market
The onus of proof rests with the involved parties.
Meinl is  not solely active in retailing, hence the EC assumes that the decision to di-
vest its  food-retailing division is  rather a management decision. The firm may seek to 
focus on other lines of business, which seem more promising. Therefore, the EC 
could not support argument number one. The other two arguments could neither be 
testified. There is  no evidence that, among all retailers, Rewe would be best qualified 
to acquire Meinl. Moreover, the argument that Rewe would be the best candidate for 
anti-competitive reasons is contrary to the EC‘s findings.112 
Nevertheless, Rewe and Meinl could not supply evidence for any of the three argu-
ments. Therefore, in summary the EC believes that a merged firm would have a 
dominant position in the Austrian market of food-retailing.113 
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5.2.4 The Procurement Market
Buyer Power can also have beneficial effects  on welfare. If both the supply and de-
mand side of a market are in strong positions, it may compensate for seller power. 
This  is  referred to as countervailing power.114In this case it is assumed that benefits 
buyers receive are more likely to be passed on to final consumers. 
In retailing, the distribution market is strongly related to the procurement market. If a 
retailer holds a big share as seller on the supply side of the market, he will probably 
have a big share on the demand side of the market, since he procures the goods fi-
nal consumers  ask for. Furthermore, a big share of the procurement market may en-
able the retailer to obtain exclusive conditions  (e.g: exclusive contracts or conditional 
purchase arrangements) from suppliers. If the retailer seeks to drive competitors  out 
of the market by employing these conditions, the benefits for final consumers  are lim-
ited. They only profit until competitors are driven out of the market and the retailer 
holds a dominant position.115 This effect is also known as the waterbed effect116.
5.2.4.1 Relevant product markets
The following deals with the product markets on the demand side. In order to define 
the relevant product market, it is important to examine producers‘ flexibility. In gen-
eral, a manufacturer in the food industry produces only a specific range of products. 
For example: bakers, confectioners or butchers  do not produce the full range of 
products available at the supermarket. Hence, it is essential to investigate whether a 
manufacturer could alter production without major obstacles in order to produce a di-
verse product.
For instance, a butcher willing to make bread first needs some investment and spe-
cial knowledge in order to alter production and bake bread professionally. However, 
since a producer‘s capability to switch production from one product to another is lim-
ited, the procurement market is  divided into nineteen different product categories 
such as: fresh fruit and vegetables; meat and sausages; poultry and eggs; frozen 
foods; baby foods; pet foods; detergents, polishes, cleaning products; body care 
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products, etc. Within these product categories a clear market structure can be de-
rived. However, manufacturers of different product categories vary from one another. 
In particular, manufacturers of food and non-food items differ from each other in 
terms of firm size and number of competitors. Manufacturers of non-food items such 
as body-care products or detergents are often large international corporations, 
whereas suppliers of fresh-food such as  fruits, vegetables, bread and meat are rather 
small to medium-sized firms.117 
Furthermore, to define the relevant product market, it is  essential to examine the al-
ternative channels of distribution such as cash-and-carry, wholesale or delicatessen. 
Retailers are not the only buyers on the market but they certainly take the majority of 
goods into charge. Besides, it is difficult for the supplier to switch between different 
channels of distribution, since products  have to be customised. For instance, a trader 
specialised in delicate food may ask for different marketing and packaging than a 
wholesaler. Therefore, a supplier may be forced to overhaul its machinery completely, 
in order to live up to the expectations of new customers. Hence, the EC assumes that 
it takes major investments and modifications to switch to another channel of distribu-
tion, and so it is not seen as a good alternative for substitution.118 
5.2.4.2 Relevant geographic markets 
The European Union facilitates to merchandise goods across Europe. Therefore it is 
assumed that retailers  now can choose between suppliers  from all over Europe. 
However, most of the products sold by Austrian retailers are made in Austria. Al-
though prices in Austria are, compared to the German neighbour, about 20% higher, 
retailers  still purchase on average 80% of their goods at national suppliers. This is 
mostly due to consumers‘ preferences, since Austrian products are considered to be 
of high quality. In fact, even goods  produced by international corporations are sold 
via their national offices to guarantee services such as shelf maintenance and market 
research. These services can be best realised by national subsidiaries since they 
possess the relevant cultural knowledge. Besides, consumers‘ preferences vary sig-
nificantly across Europe. Even products designed for the German market have to be 
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altered for the Austrian market, since consumers‘ tastes and preferences differ. 
Therefore, the geographic market is national.119 
5.2.4.3 Competitive assessment  
After determining the relevant product markets on a geographic level, the following 
provides some practical information on the markets. 
On average each product market (product category) consists  of 22 producers. How-
ever, product markets covering non-food items are higher concentrated than others. 
Hence, the average number of producers of basic foods, dairy goods, meat and sau-
sage products lies above the average at 40-50 producers within each category. Fur-
thermore, the concentration among firms in the distribution market is higher than in 
the procurement market. Less than 10 food retailers control the market, five of whom 
operate their business  all over Austria, namely Rewe, Meinl, Spar, ADEG and Löwa. 
The others  are small specialised traders, and Metro, a cash-and-carry wholesaler 
holding a market share of about one-tenth.120
This  indicates that food retailers are indispensable for producers‘ survival for several 
reasons. First, a large proportion of a producer‘s turnover is effectuated by food-
retailing chains. In all product markets, except for baby foods, body care and cosmet-
ics, and bread and pastries, retailers account for more than 50% of producers‘ turn-
over. Second, according to suppliers, losing a food-retailer undertaking a share of 
more than 20% has major implications for their economic activity. Other retailers may 
be unable to take on the lost business, and changing to other channels of distribution 
is  for most producers  out of the question, since costs for altering production outweigh 
profits. Another alternative is to carry on an export trade. However, it takes about five 
years until an adequate level of products  can be exported and the business becomes 
profitable. Furthermore, Austrian producers export only a very small proportion of 
their production. 
Consequently, a producer is, compared to a retailer rather limited in choosing his 
trading partners. In addition, Rewe already accounts  for a big proportion of produc-
ers‘ total turnover on average. Therefore, a combined firm with Meinl would lead to a 
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level close to 40%. This is  alarming, since producers mentioned in a survey that los-
ing a retailer accounting for more than 22% of their turnover would be hard to re-
place. Consequently a producer is rather limited in comparison to a retailer.121 
On the other side, the largest supplier retailers face in Austria is the Nestlé group. 
However, the proportion of its trade volume is far from being dominant. Nevertheless, 
Rewe and Meinl argue that there is a major dependency on suppliers, especially for 
branded food and Austrian products. The latter can certainly be denied. In fact, con-
sumers demand products made in Austria, but there are sufficient suppliers, espe-
cially in the fresh food sector. Hence, a relationship of dependence could not be veri-
fied. The truth of the argument that retailers depend on suppliers of branded prod-
ucts, is subject to consumers‘ reactions after a delisting of such a must-store product. 
Thus, the worst reaction would be that consumers  do their entire shopping else-
where, since this product is  no longer available at this store. However, this  is  rather 
unlikely as in most cases consumers find a substitute product they can buy instead of 
the branded one. Hence, it is assumed that consumers rather emphasise shopping 
convenience rather than product brands. Therefore, they will be more likely to switch 
to substitute products than do their entire shopping at another retailer. Hence, the EC 
could not find any evidence in favour of retailers‘ dependence on suppliers.122
5.2.4.4 Rewe/Meinlʻs Strengths
As mentioned before, Rewe‘s  centralised organisation is not only beneficial for the 
distribution but also for the procurement market. It takes  Rewe about 2 weeks to in-
troduce a new product to all of its  Billa stores. This is out of reach for its biggest 
competitor Spar. Furthermore, a producer willing to sell his products all over Austria 
has to contract most certainly with Rewe. Due to the fact that a major part of the total 
turnover in food-retailing is effectuated in the eastern part, it is needless to say that it 
is  rather impossible as a producer to circumvent Rewe, since it dominates the market 
in the East.123 
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Another strength is  Rewe‘s own-branded product range. A strong own-branded prod-
uct line enables  a retailer to exert power over its  suppliers. Manufacturers of products 
other than must-store are especially affected, since a retailer can replace those eas-
ily with his  own-branded products. Therefore, no-name products face a higher risk of 
being delisted.124       
In summary, the EC assumes that a merger between the two parties involved would 
lead to a dominant position in the procurement market, since it would even increase 
Rewe‘s already high volume of purchase.125 
5.2.5 Findings
Given that under these conditions the EC would reject the merger, the involved par-
ties suggested the following:126
• Rewe will purchase only 162 out of a total of 341 Meinl stores 
• 45 out of these 162 stores are converted into Bipa drugstores
• Rewe will not acquire stores within the eastern part of Austria
• Meinl will continue its  operation in food-retailing with 179 shops independent 
from Rewe, mainly in East-Austria
Under these conditions  the EC is permitting the merger. Given that Rewe would not 
acquire any stores  in the eastern part of Austria, one of the key arguments against 
the merger could be rejected. Furthermore, the EC‘s concern that a combined firm 
would own the majority of large-format outlets could be denied, since Rewe acquires 
only 16 out of the 40 PamPam stores. Besides, Rewe originally intended to acquire 
twice as many stores at key locations. Moreover, it can not be assumed that the ac-
quisition of 162 stores will affect the procurement market significantly, since Meinl 
remains an active player in food retailing. More precisely, 41% of Meinl‘s volume on 
the procurement market will be transferred to Rewe. However, this reinforces Rewe‘s 
position in non-food markets by 1 to 1.5 %, which is even beneficial, given that the 
concentration of suppliers in the non-food section is  rather high.127 In summary Rewe 
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acquires 34% of Meinl, and thereby increasing its  market share by 2.5% to a total of 
32.5%.128
5.2.6 Conclusion
The findings and the decision of the EC indicate that Rewe has a lot of potential to 
dominate the Austrian market in various ways. Therefore, the acquisition could not be 
accepted implicitly. The merger could only be permitted under certain conditions and 
those cannot be rejected as irrelevant. Of the 341 stores Rewe intended to acquire, 
only 117 are  pursued as grocery stores. The decision set an example in the Austrian 
and even European history of food retailing. However, the decision occurred a dec-
ade ago and the market probably changed ever since. Therefore, we will continue to 
investigate the recent events, which marked the development of the Austrian market. 
On April 23rd, 2008 Rewe announces its  intention to become ADEG‘s controlling 
shareholder with a share of 75%.129 This case reveals interesting details  on the Aus-
trian food retailing industry. Although the case is different from the Rewe/Meinl deci-
sion, it is a good way to gain insight into recent developments. Therefore, in the fol-
lowing the EC‘s decision on the case Rewe/ADEG is examined.130 
5.3 The Case Rewe/ ADEG 
The following evaluation of Rewe/ADEG is based on the official release of the Euro-
pean Commission on June 23rd, 2008 (Case Nr. COMP/M.5047- REWE/ ADEG). 
Rewe intends to become ADEG‘s controlling shareholder by acquiring 75% of 
ADEG‘s shares. The other 25% should remain with ADEG‘s independent traders 
(ADEG Österreich Grosseinkauf - AÖGen). Prior to the merger the largest share-
holders include ADEG‘s independent traders (AÖGen) with a share of 37.6% fol-
lowed by Edeka Chiemgau with 37.5% and finally Rewe with a share of 24.9%. Since 
Rewe and ADEG‘s individual turnover at the EU-level exceeds 250 million and at 
least two member states are involved, the EC was found responsible to investigate 
this case.131
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The following case bears resemblance with the Rewe/Meinl case. One argument in 
favour of the takeover is  ADEG‘s exit from the market. However the onus of proof 
rests within the involved parties.132  
5.3.1 ADEG
The Austrian company ADEG acts not only as retailer, but also as wholesaler in the 
food industry. It operates three wholesale distribution centres, 19 cash-and-carry 
markets  and 83 retail stores, whereas 15 are operated as hypermarkets (Magnet) 
and 11 as ADEG convenience stores. In addition, ADEG supplies  582 independent 
shops, which include 472 convenience stores with a size below 400 m².133
5.3.2 The Wholesale Market 
Given that ADEG operates as wholesaler in the food industry, the EC has to investi-
gate the relevant market. However, Rewe only operates to a very small extent in 
wholesaling. Therefore, it can be assumed that a merger between Rewe and ADEG 
does not affect the  wholesaling market significantly, and a detailed investigation of 
the relevant market can be neglected.134 
5.3.3 The Distribution Market
In general the relevant market remains identical as in the Rewe/Meinl case. The 
market thus includes supermarkets, hypermarkets, and discounters. While in the 
Rewe/Meinl case it was questioned whether to include discounters, they are certainly 
included in this case, as the following demonstrates.135 
Even though the main discounters (Hofer and Lidl) offer a narrower product range 
than the full-range-retailers, consumers  still find a sufficient range of convenience 
goods, including fresh food. Moreover, Hofer and Lidl more than doubled their market 
share between 1997 and 2007 up to 24%. Hence, it is  assumed that discounters 
have to be considered as competitors in the market. In addition the major retailers, 
Spar and Rewe, claim that discounters impose competitive restrictions on them. They 
argue that price reductions by discounters directly affect them insofar as they are 
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forced to adapt prices of own-branded products and key value items in order to re-
main competitive. Moreover, prices of branded products are affected likewise, since 
in the long run the price gap of branded and unbranded products becomes wider. 
High prices of branded products may not be justified any longer and therefore have 
to be adapted equally. As  a consequence, the EC found strong evidence to include 
discounters in the relevant market.136 
The relevant geographic market is national. Retailers stated that prices are estab-
lished for a national market and do not vary significantly across  Austria, although ad-
vertising differs in various regions. This  corresponds to the findings  of the Rewe/
Meinl case.137  
5.3.4 The Procurement Market
The upstream market involves those transactions in which products are sold from the 
manufacturer or producer to the retailer, but excludes those to the final consumer. In 
the Rewe/Meinl case the relevant product markets involved nineteen different prod-
uct categories. The market definition of the current case is  adopted from the Rewe/
Meinl case. However, it is extended by one product category, since suppliers  thought 
to seperate the market for poultry and eggs.138 
On the geographic level the market definition deflects from the Rewe/Meinl case. 
While in the Rewe/Meinl case the EC was convinced that the market is national due 
to consumers‘ preference for Austrian products and the difficulty to switch to other 
distribution channels or export products, the situation now is slightly different. A mar-
ket survey revealed that export levels  differ significantly among product categories. In 
any case the definition of the relevant market can be neglected. It is assumed that a 
merger would not have any anti-competitive effects  on the upstream market, there-
fore its market definition is negligible.139     
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5.3.5 The competitive assessment of the distribution market
A combined market share of REWE and ADEG would account for 35.4% in 2008. In 
Table (6) the market shares of the major retailers are illustrated, together with the 
number of stores and the store formats  they operate. Number one in terms of market 
share is  Rewe, followed by Spar and Hofer. All of the other competitors have a mar-
ket share below 6%. 
Table6: The major retailers in Austria in 2008 
Retailers Number 
of stores
Hypermarkets Supermarkets Independent 
Retailers
Discounters Market 
share
REWE
International AG
1388 MERKUR BILLA SUTTERLÜTTY PENNY 30.3%
SPAR 1421 INTERSPAR
EUROSPAR
MAXIMAKRT
EUROSPAR
SPAR
SPAR 28.3%
Hofer 410 HOFER 19.9%
ADEG 966 MAGNET ADEG Aktiv
ADEG
ADEG Aktiv
ADEG
5.1%
ZEV MARKANT 693 TABOR, 
PRO Kaufland
WELAS
NAH&FRISCH
UNIMARKT
NAH&FRISCH
+ Kaufleute
4.5%
ZIELPUNKT 365 ZIELPUNKT PLUS 4.3%
LIDL 168 LIDL 3.4%
MPREIS 146 M-PREIS
Source: AC Nielsen, Handel in Österreich Basisdaten 2007 und 2008 
http://google.acnielsen.com/search?site=at_nielsen_com&client=at_nielsen&proxystylesheet=at_nielsen
&output=xml_no_dtd&q=basisdaten+handel (accessed August 2009)
It is not the increased market share which poses a major problem in this  case. In the 
Rewe/Meinl case the large market share together with the powerful position in the 
eastern part of Austria was alarming, since there was only one adequate competitor, 
namely SPAR, with a market share of more than 20%. However, in recent years dis-
counters evolved more into full range retailers. Even though their product range is 
still narrower, they are certainly strong competitors in the market. As illustrated in Ta-
ble (6) Hofer has a market share close to 20%. Hence, it is assumed that a merger of 
Rewe and ADEG would not harm competition on a national level. However, the EC is 
rather concerned that local markets are affected. The focus of the EC therefore, lies 
on the assessment of anti-competitive effects in local markets.140 
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Rewe argues that ADEG‘s independent traders (AÖGen) should not be included in 
the market since they are autonomous. However, according to the EC‘s investiga-
tions these traders are indeed dependent on ADEG and can in no way be seen as 
ADEG‘s competitors. They adhere to price suggestions made by ADEG, since prices 
are memorised in the cash register system and alterations have to be done manually 
by each individual trader. Besides, they often agree on purchase commitments to ob-
tain favourable conditions from ADEG, such as lower store rents. In many cases 
ADEG owns the premise but rents it out to independent traders. Moreover, 85% to 
95% of independent traders participate in collective campaigns initiated by ADEG. In 
addition the AÖGen holds a share of 37.6% of ADEG and is supposed to hold a 
share of 25% after the acquisition by Rewe. Hence, the EC could not find any evi-
dence to exclude the AÖGen from the market.141  
The EC stated that the competitive pressure on the market through ADEG is rather 
low. According to a survey in April 2007, ADEG was the most expensive supermarket 
in Austria, followed by Billa and Spar. Therefore, it is assumed that after a merger 
with Rewe, ADEG‘s prices would rather fall than rise, which is in consumers‘ inter-
ests. Besides, in the last decade ADEG‘s market share decreased by nearly 50%, 
since it had to close down several shops. Furthermore, except for its MAGNET hy-
permarkets, ADEG operates  mostly in rural areas as regional supplier. Therefore, it 
rarely encounters the rather urban Billa. Hence, the EC estimates ADEG‘s competi-
tive pressure on Rewe or the market of food retailing in general as rather low or even 
absent.142  
However, Rewe‘s largest competitor Spar argued they would be adversely affected 
by an acquisition of ADEG, since Rewe could increase its purchase power. Neverthe-
less, it is  not assumed that Spar would be significantly affected. In Austria retailers  of 
different size compete successfully in the same market. Hence, it is  surprising that 
Rewe‘s largest competitor complains about the merger, whereas the other smaller 
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competitors deny that an acquisition would create a serious threat to exit the market, 
as indicated in a market survey.143 
Furthermore the EC conducted a study to investigate the local markets. Even though 
prices are set on a national level, it is assumed that competition on a local level influ-
ences prices. Therefore the applied data was  edited according to the 121 districts in 
Austria, since  this  seemed most adequate to investigate local markets. The objective 
was to examine the concentration of Rewe/ADEG in those districts. This may be an 
important indicator, in addition to national market shares, to examine the markets. 
Hence, a district was considered critical if one of the two following criteria was met:144
• The turnover of the combined firms exceeds 45%, plus there is an increase in 
turnover
• The turnover of the combined firms lies between 35% and 45%, plus the in-
crease in turnover exceeds 5%
According to these criteria the EC identified 24 critical districts. It is assumed that 
Rewe/ADEG could possibly influence national pricing, since those districts account 
for 20% of the total population in Austria and are dominated by Rewe/ADEG in terms 
of turnover. Therefore, the EC found that the acquisition could not be permitted, un-
less conditions are altered.145     
5.3.5.1 Modifications
Given these concerns, in order to complete the merger the involved parties sug-
gested the following: 
I. Shops owned by ADEG within the critical districts will be sold to independent 
buyers
II. Independent traders of the AÖGen can choose freely any wholesaler 
The second condition was fulfilled when the following could be verified:
a) The independent trader is  not obliged to comply with a period of notice 
longer than 3 months
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b) Upon completion of business relations the independent trader is  not 
charged a lump-sum exceeding € 50, 000
In addition, ADEG is obliged to offer those traders willing to terminate their contract a 
tenancy agreement at current market prices with a contract duration of at least five 
years, in case ADEG is the lessor of the store. Plus, ADEG is obligated to assist 
traders in critical districts to leave the company within the next 5 to 10 years. How-
ever, they do not have to force independent traders unwilling to leave ADEG.146
Consequently, a district is  no longer considered critical if one of the following condi-
tions applies:
• The combined turnover of Rewe and ADEG does not exceed 35%
• The combined turnover of Rewe and ADEG lies between 35% and 45%, but 
the increase in turnover is below 5%
• There is no increase in turnover due to the merger 
In case the involved parties do not meet the requirements within the period stipu-
lated, Rewe has to sell an adequate number of its  own stores (BILLA, MERKUR, 
PENNY) in those critical districts. This is  known as the ‘Kronjuwelen-Regelung.‘147 
Hence, in such a case Rewe is  obligated to sell as many of its own shops, equal to at 
least 65% of the turnover, independent traders effectuate within these districts.148  
Since the involved parties agreed to adhere to these terms, the EC could reject the 
concerns regarding the merger. Therefore, the EC concluded that a merger between 
Rewe and ADEG would not have any significant effects on prices.149
5.3.6 Competitive Assessment of the Procurement Market 
As mentioned above, it is not assumed that a merger would lead to an increase of 
Rewe‘s power in the procurement market. In 13 out of the 20 product markets a 
combined firm would have a market share bigger than 15%. In the Rewe/Meinl case 
the critical threshold was at 22%, due to the fact that a manufacturer‘s economic 
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situation would be significantly affected by losing a customer with a market share of 
more than 22%.150 
In this case four product markets, namely poultry, diary products, beer, and wine and 
alcohols, have a market share above 22%. This implies that Rewe/ADEG would have 
buyer power in these markets. In fact, as  indicated by suppliers in a market survey 
conducted by the EC, Rewe already has buyer power in the procurement market. 
Consequently, Rewe‘s buyer power is  not new to suppliers. Still they object that the 
acquisition of ADEG could possibly strengthen Rewe‘s power significantly. In addi-
tion, due to the modifications in the local distribution markets, the EC denies that the 
acquisition would have any detrimental effects on the procurement market.151 
5.3.7 Conclusion 
The EC decided to permit the acquisition of 75% of ADEG‘s shares, since Rewe ac-
cepted the conditions imposed. 
The process to sell shops according to the terms imposed by the EC passed through 
3 different stages. The second was  accomplished in December 2008, which included 
the disposal of 62 shops willing to be sold. Thus, 31 shops were acquired by ZEV 
MARKANT (Nah&Frisch) and the others by Spar and Unimarkt. The last stage should 
be completed in June 2009 and all requirements should be met by that time. M-Preis 
acquired 20 shops in Salzburg and Carinthia. None of the critical districts were lo-
cated in Tyrol and Vorarlberg, hence, no shops had to be sold there.152 
The official representation of employees, the AK (Arbeiterkammer), is nevertheless 
sceptical about the the takeover. Although hundreds of jobs can be be guaranteed, 
the acquisition of 75% of ADEG‘s  shares is considered critical in terms of market 
concentration. The AK criticises that the EC did not scrutinise the market as sched-
uled. They set the  concentration level to consider a market as critical in terms of 
competition at 45%. This is overestimated considering the small size of Austria. In 
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addition, the decision of the EC  sets a signal. Other retailers active in Austria may be 
induced to increase their market share, due to the EC‘s indulgence.153 
5.4 The Inflation Rate and Price Developments in Austria from 2007-2008 
Since September 2007 the inflation rate increased steadily as demonstrated in Figure 
(6) by the consumer price index (VPI: Verbraucherpreisindex). The VPI is  an indicator 
for the inflation and price development in Austria. In December 2007 the VPI 
amounted to 3.6%, however in June 2008 it reached its peak with 3.9%.     
Figure 6: Inflation in % in Austria from 2006 to 2008 
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Source: Statistik Austria: VPI Inflationsraten 1998 bis 2008 
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/preise/verbraucherpreisindex_vpi_hvpi/index.html (accessed 
November 2009)
In particular, prices  for food, energy, housing and transport increased in Austria, 
which raised a significant political discussion.154  In 2007 prices for consumer goods 
increased by 2.2% whereas food prices increased by 4.1%. This is particularly alarm-
ing since it mostly affects  people with low incomes, as  products such as bread, but-
ter, eggs, milk and vegetables experienced the highest price increases.    
There can be several reasons for a high inflation rate, such as global development, 
increasing oil prices, rising demand for food from Asia, as  well as speculation on the 
world market. In addition, politics are of major importance, since the already scarce 
resources like crop and oil seed are being used for the production of agrofuel, for in-
stance biodiesel and ethanol. The production is boosted by subventions and tax 
abatements by the U.S. and European governments; this in turn increases food 
prices.155
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However, it is  argued that besides international and political factors  the inflation in the 
Austrian food market is largely ‘homemade‘.156Hence, in each product category a dis-
tinction is  made between international and country-specific factors influencing the in-
flation rate. It is particularly important to find out to which extent the high inflation rate 
can be traced back to domestic factors.157Critics  believe that the already bad situa-
tion on the world markets has  been used in Austria to raise prices within the supply 
chain without an actual reason. As a consequence the big three retailers: Hofer, Spar 
and Rewe came under suspicion of price fixing.158 
5.4.1 The Austrian inflation rate by comparison
Since September 2007 food prices increased at a level above the inflation rate, which 
is demonstrated in more detail in Figure (7). 
Figure 7: Price development in % of Food compared to the Consumer Price Index (VPI)
in Austria from 2006-2008
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Data Source: Statistik Austria: Sonderauswertungen: Ernährung VPI 2005 
http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/index.html (accessed November 2009)
It shows the differences in price development between the consumer price index 
(VPI) and the Food Index. The consumer price index consists  of a certain consumer 
basket, including essential goods and services. The consumer basket is  divided into 
12 categories such as food, clothing, habitation, household goods, transport, educa-
tion, culture, tourism, etc. The Food Index includes aliments and non-alcoholic 
drinks.159In January 2008 it reached its peak. The inflation rate increased by 5.6%, 
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however food prices increased by 12.9%. Hence there was a difference of 7.3% in 
price development. 
5.4.2 Comparision in the euro zone
According to a report by the AK in August 2008, prices in Austria were on average 
24.4% higher than in neighbouring Germany. They compared prices of 72 identical 
products such as oil, butter, margarine, mozzarella, cream cheese, Camembert, 
Gouda cheese, Emmentaler, whole milk, spaghetti, mini-baguette, and wholemeal 
bread in Vienna and Passau (Germany). Including: Billa, Hofer, Interspar, Lidl, 
Merkur, Penny Markt, Spar, Zielpunkt, Adeg and Magnet in Vienna, Aldi, Netto, Kau-
fland, DEZ E-Center, Real, E-Aktiv-Markt Schwaiberger, Lidl, Penny, Norma, Plus 
nahkauf frisch+schnell and Rewe in Passau. Not only do prices in Vienna generally 
exceed those in Passau, but identical products  from the same retailer are also more 
expensive in Austria. For instance, Lidl in Vienna charges on average 20.1% more for 
19 identical products than Lidl in Passau. Zielpunkt even surcharges consumers in 
Vienna on average by 30.4% for 18 identical products than its German sister Plus. In 
the case of Penny, four identical products were found to be on average 20.6% more 
expensive than in Germany and at Hofer in Vienna one product was priced 16.2% 
more than at Aldi in Passau.160      
Additionally, a report of the Austrian Competition Commission revealed the following:
In 2006 bread and cereal products were, after Finnland, most expensive in Austria 
and on average 18% higher than in the euro zone. In 2007 prices continued to in-
crease even more than in the euro zone.161  
In 2006 Austria was  ranked number four in terms of best prices for the product cate-
gory milk, cheese and eggs, only Germany, the Netherlands and Spain being less 
expensive. But in 2007 the inflation rate increased and it is assumed that country-
specific coefficients are responsible for more than half of this increase. In total, the 
price increase within this  product category was significantly above the trend of the 
euro zone.162  
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In the product category of soda, lemonade and juice the country-specific coefficients 
contributed to a large proportion of the ascending inflation. It is  even assumed that 
the reason for the high inflation in 2006 and 2007 can be attributed mostly to country-
specific factors.163    
Given that the inflation rate and the increase in food prices in Austria was higher than 
in other countries, there is a rebuttable presumption that there have to be other 
country-specific factors influencing the inflation in Austria.164  Therefore the AK at-
tempted to illuminate the reasons for the high inflation rate and further made sugges-
tions to improve the situation in Austria.
5.4.3 In search of an offender 
High food prices were triggered by high prices of agricultural commodities  (crop, 
sugar and oil seed) on the world market. In short, this was due to a high demand of 
food from Asia, shortfalls in important areas of cultivation, and speculations on the 
world market. In addition the soaring food prices in 2007 can be explained by a sup-
plemental competitor on the food market. Since the production of agrofuels became 
heavily supported by governments in the EU and USA, producers  of agrofuels be-
came big players in the food market. In 2007 the USA produced ethanol out of 85 mil-
lion tons  of corn, which accounts for one quarter of the American corn harvest. This 
represents an increase of 30 million tons compared to the previous  year. Despite the 
enhanced food production this  led to a shortage of resources and, as a conse-
quence, higher food prices on the world market. Nevertheless these global develop-
ments do not fully explain the heavy increase of food prices in Austria. Therefore the 
AK concludes that an already high inflation has been used by market participants to 
increase margins within the supply chain. The National Bank of Austria supports  this 
argument. The market participants certainly denied this reproach. However, it is hard 
to deny since the increase of food prices from 2006 to 2007 in Austria is  on average 
much higher than in the euro zone. Food prices increased on average by 66.7%, 
bread and cereal products by 28.7%, vegetables by 72.7%, soda and lemonades by 
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71.4%, fish and sea food by 100% and milk, cheese and eggs by 144% in Austria 
compared to the average country of the euro zone.165 
Experts  see the lack of competition in the Austrian food market as one of the main 
reasons for these price developments, not only in the concentration among retailers 
but also among producers. This is especially so in in fields such as dairy products, 
gristmills, sugar and slaughterhouses.166In addition the Austrian Competition Author-
ity (Bundes-wettbewerbs-behörde:BWB) is accused of being inactive. For instance, in 
February 2008 the brewing industry in Austria announced in the media that it would 
increase prices. This should be alarming to Competition Authorities. In Germany a 
similar case was investigated immediately by the Competition Authority. However, the 
Austrian Competition Authority did not see any need for action. It is argued that a 
powerful Competition Authority could alleviate problems. If firms are forced to publi-
cise their activities, an investigation of the entire supply chain could be guaranteed, 
which gives some indication of the guilty party. This is hard to accomplish if the in-
volved parties do not have to disclose their activities.167 
5.4.4 The response to the price developments
The development of prices raised a big public discussion and politicians  came under 
pressure to take action. As  a consequence, the former minister for economic affairs, 
Martin Bartenstein prompted the Austrian Competition Commission (Wettbewerb-
skommission) to investigate the recent events. This  was surprising since the Austrian 
Competition Commission is  only the advisory board of the ministry and the Competi-
tion Authority (BWB). It has no rights to inspection, hence its competences are rather 
limited. The  Competition Authority, on the other hand, is more powerful and better 
qualified for these studies. It is  capable to initiate a house search or ask the involved 
parties to reveal important information. As a consequence it was nearly impossible 
for the Competition Commission to obtain first hand information. None of the accused 
parties was willing to provide key figures, some not even annual accounts.168 There-
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fore, the Competition Commission was required to do its research based on a report 
by the economic research institute (WIFO). They concluded that the price increase in 
2007 was mostly due to country-specific factors, especially for cheese, eggs and di-
ary products. In the euro zone, prices in the product category of fats and oils  even 
decreased the first half year in 2007, whereas in Austria prices increased. However, 
these findings are not surprising.169 
In its 2008 report the AK made three important suggestions to improve the situation:
I. Monitoring
In Austria no public institution collects data or calculates economic key figures in 
order to monitor competition on a regular basis, only some private market re-
search institutions do so eratically. However, in order to prevent fraudulent use, it 
is  important to establish an early-warning system. Transparency is  in particular 
important in those markets where all signs point to market abuse. Especially on 
the producer level, data is  rare, and the knowledge limited. This opacity enables 
market participants  to enforce price increases more easily, since it is  hard to 
prove them guilty. In order to prevent market abuse the Competition Authority 
(BWB) should be provided with sufficient funds to implement a monitoring sys-
tem.   
II. Earlier interventions in market developments 
The market for agrofuels competes directly with the food market. Therefore, it 
would have been important to interfere immediately in these developments, 
since this contributed largely to the global increase of food prices. 
III. Immediate investigations in case price increases get publicly announced
The AK was not the only institution exerting pressure on the government. The fact 
that the Austrian food market was malfunctioning was also based on findings  by the 
National Bank of Austria, the WIFO and IHS (Institute of Advanced Studies). Even the 
study initiated by Mr. Bartenstein clearly indicated a need for action. Nevertheless the 
government remained inactive. In consequence, in June 2008 the AK decided to file 
a petition according to the Austrian Price Law. More precisely they demanded that 
the Ministry of Economy  investigates whether REWE, Spar, Hofer, Lidl and Zielpunkt 
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are in direct proportion to the price developments in Austria. Since knowledge on the 
entire supply chain is  scarce, the AK adheres to its findings about retailers. This does 
not entail that they consider them as the only guilty ones within the supply chain.170  
After the petition by the AK, the Ministry of Economy appointed a price committee. 
Representatives of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (WKÖ), the AK, the Ag-
ricultural Chambers (Landwirtschaftskammern), the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry 
for Social Affairs  and Consumer Protection and the Ministry of Agriculture had to join 
this  committee, chaired by the Ministry of Economy. However, after six sessions the 
proposal to audit the Austrian retailers in detail was rejected. To the regret of the AK, 
the majority of representatives found that prices in Austria did not increase signifi-
cantly in recent time, even though numbers  and reports indicate the reverse.171 
Therefore we have to assume that the decision-making was not based on facts.   
6.Conclusion
Each and every one of us is inevitably a customer of food-retailers. The days are 
over where people acted as self-supporters and lived from their home-grown fruits 
and vegetables and the few things  they bought at the corner shop next door. As a 
consequence retailers have taken a powerful position in our everyday life. Everyone 
can form her own opinion about these developments. 
However, we and especially authorities should become suspicious  if food prices in 
Austria are for no reason significantly higher than in Germany. The two countries are 
directly comparable as the major retailers  act in both countries and the inflation rate 
could not made responsible for the high differences  in prices. Therefore the increase 
in Austrian food prices has to be driven by the retailers and can not be blamed on 
global developments, since these affect both countries equally. Assuming that the 
onus of proof would rest with retailers, it is hard to think of any arguments to prove 
them innocent.
Furthermore competition among Austrian food retailers did certainly not increase. 
High barriers to entry make it almost impossible for newcomers to enter the Austrian 
market. Plus, the five-firm buyer concentration in Austria increased from 1999 to 
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2008 from 60.2% to 88.1% and is all along one of the highest across Europe.172  Al-
though the decision on the Rewe/Meinl case in 1999 clarified that a further concen-
tration of Austrian retailers could be devastating, the concentration level increased 
onwards. Therefore the acquisition of ADEG by Rewe is not seen as creating further 
harm, since it is only the icing on the cake.
All indications are that the Austrian market in food retailing has its independent exis-
tence due to high or even adamant barriers to entry, low competition, a high concen-
tration level, idle politicians and an inattentive competition authority. Although  there 
is  strong evidence for retailers‘ power in the Austrian food market, all attempts for fur-
ther detailed investigations failed. The Austrian Competition Authority seems unwill-
ing to face this problem. Similar in-depth investigations of various institutions in Aus-
tria came to the same result: The Austrian food retailing market clearly lacks trans-
parency. This is not solely a problem in food retailing, however this  would go beyond 
the scope of this discussion. 
In order to get a clear picture, retailers have to reveal more information and data.  So 
far it has been impossible to have a full understanding of the situation due to insuffi-
cient evidence. With more information available, it would be possible to make major 
investigations on the food market and its supply chain. However, this  rests on politi-
cians and the Austrian Competition Authority to rectify this in the future.
The lesson is clear: There is  an urgent need of action from authorities and politicians, 
if we want to preserve the quality of food and the fairness towards consumers. In my 
opinion from all the consumer products food is most valuable, since YOU ARE WHAT 
YOU EAT.
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http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/index.html (accessed November 
2009)
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10.Curriculum Vitae
EDUCATION
Oct 2004 - Jan 2010 University Vienna:
Master in International Business Administration
Major Subjects: 
Corporate Finance (Prof. Josef Zechner) 
International Management (Prof. Josef Windsperger)
Aug 08 - Dec 08 Lund University (Sweden): Reassume
School of Economics and Management
1995 - 2003 Secondary School 
Kreuzschwestern Orth (in 4810 Gmunden – Austria)
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE during my Studies
2009 Human Resource Management Divisions - Volksbank in Vienna
since 
Oct 09
Contract design, Correspondence, Communication and assistance of  HR Busi-
ness Partners
2009 The Economist Group GmbH (Vienna)
3 months Receptionist: Customer care, Correspondence, Communication and assistance 
in daily affairs 
2008 Holiday replacement at Leasing company “VB-Leasing“ in Vienna
1 month (holiday replacement of secretary):Customer care, Correspondence, Communi-
cation and assistance in daily affairs 
2007 Internship at “Volksbank Invest“ (Fund of Funds Management) in Vienna
1 month Detailed fund-analysis via Zephyr Style Advisor, Work flow  automating of pro-
gram features and training of management, Assistance of management in its 
daily affairs
10/07-07/
08
Working student at Micromed Mittermayer Service and Consulting
10 months Data processing of medical statements via WHONET Software and general data 
base management
2006 Internship at “Volksbank Invest“ (Fund of Funds Management) in Vienna
2 months Zephyr Style Advisor: Test run of software package Zephyr Style Advisor, 
Evaluation and implementation of  software tools for fund management, Analysis 
of strengths and weaknesses with further presentation of  findings and instruction 
of management to the program
Furthermore:
Processing of information material, Quantitative and qualitative fund analysis 
(Precise selection of  fund universes, Reduction of raw  data, Market observation 
an assistance in various analysing operations)
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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE before my studies
2004 Tourist Guide at the “Schloss Orth“ in Gmunden - Austria
1 month Guided tours in German, English and French
2003-2004 Aupair in Geneva - Switzerland
14 month Childcare and housekeeping, Intensive french language course and language 
practice based on everyday use of language 
2002 Caregiver at the Nursing Home in Gmunden - Austria
1 month Care and fosterage of elderly challenged persons, Arrangement of  acitivies and 
excursions
2001 Internship at the Agency for cultural affairs in Gmunden - Austria
1 month Assistance in the organisation of the yearly pottery market (with Spain as host 
country) 
OHTHER SKILLS
Langues German: fluent (mother tongue)
English: fluent (TOEFL Test of English as a foreign language - 2007)
French: fluent (Alliance française Diplôme de Langue Française - 2004)
Swedish : basics
IT MS-Office, ECDL (2002), Lotus Notes, Zephyr Style Advisor
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